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ABSTRACT
In Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, the Seventh Circuit 
recently concluded that § 1610(g) of the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act does not provide a freestanding exception to 
attachment and execution immunity for the property of a foreign 
state-sponsor of terrorism. Rather, the Seventh Circuit held that in 
order for victims to avail themselves of § 1610(g), all sought-after 
property must be used for commercial activity within the United 
States. In so ruling, the court overruled two prior cases and created 
a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit, which understood § 1610(g) as 
allowing for any property in the United States owned by the foreign 
sovereign to be used for attachment and execution purposes. 
The case now sits before the Supreme Court, which needs to 
provide a definitive ruling as to how § 1610(g) applies. Numerous 
victims who hold judgments against foreign state-sponsors of 
terrorism have yet to see satisfaction as many assets are otherwise 
unavailable to them. In amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act to include § 1610(g), Congress sought to expand the range of 
assets available to victims and alleviate the problems many victims 
faced in achieving relief. Because the Supreme Court has the power 
to make foreign sovereign immunity determinations under the Act, 
the Court should give relief to the Rubin plaintiffs and others 
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similarly situated by holding that § 1610(g) allows victims to use any
property owned by the foreign sovereign and located within the 
United States for judgment satisfaction.
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INTRODUCTION
On September 4, 1997, three suicide bombers strategically 
targeted a crowded Jerusalem mall.1 By detonating suitcases filled 
with shards of glass, screws, nails, and poisonous chemicals, the 
bombers killed five people and grievously injured approximately 200 
other innocents.2 Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist organization3 that 
Iran has historically outfitted and funded,4 claimed responsibility for 
the horrific attack.5 In 2000 and 2001, two groups of American 
citizens—consisting of those who were either physically wounded in 
the attack or who suffered emotionally—brought separate suits 
against Iran and its agencies in the federal district court in 
1. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 261 
(D.D.C. 2003).
2. See id. (noting that by filling the suitcases with sharp objects and 
poisons, the bombers sought “to cause maximum pain, suffering, and death”).
3. See Hamas, NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., https://www.dni.gov/
nctc/groups/hamas.html [https://perma.cc/X3TQ-WKAB] (last visited Oct. 9, 2017). 
Hamas has conducted “many anti-Israel attacks” over the years, including “large-
scale bombings against Israeli civilian targets, small-arms attacks, improvised 
roadside explosives, and rocket attacks.” Id. See also Ch. 6 Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations, COUNTRY REP. ON TERRORISM 2015, U.S. DEP’T STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257523.htm [https://perma.cc/CNR2-2PKB] 
(last visited Oct. 9, 2017) (noting the history of Hamas).
4. See Rachel Brandenburg, Iran and the Palestinians, IRAN PRIMER,
http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iran-and-palestinians [https://perma.cc/XQ9U-
HXWG] (last visited Sept. 2, 2017). In the 1990s, the Iranian government allegedly 
gave Hamas about $30 million annually in military and financial support and
provided Hamas fighters with “advanced military training,” courtesy of the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard. See id.
5. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 262.
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Washington, D.C.6 The plaintiffs sought to sue Iran for its alleged 
involvement in the attacks as a provider of military training, 
weaponry, and financial support to Hamas.7 After finding an 
exception to Iran’s foreign sovereign immunity,8 the court held Iran 
liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries and entered a default judgment of 
$71.5 million in compensatory damages.9 However, Iran refused to 
pay the judgment, which has resulted in a decade-long succession of
attempts by the plaintiffs to execute their judgment on various 
Iranian assets located within the United States.10
Recently, the Rubin group of plaintiffs registered their 2003 
judgment in the Northern District of Illinois, seeking to attach four 
collections of ancient Persian artifacts for the purpose of satisfying 
their default judgment against Iran.11 On July 19, 2016, the Seventh 
6. See id. at 261. The plaintiffs consisted of the Campuzano parties and the 
Rubin parties. See id.
7. See id. at 260.
8. See id. at 271-72 (finding that the plaintiffs properly established an 
exception to Iran’s sovereign immunity); see also infra Section I.B (explaining this 
exception to foreign sovereign immunity).
9. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 
2016).
10. See id. (discussing some of the cases the Rubin plaintiffs have brought 
against Iranian assets).
11. See id. Though artifacts in the possession of the Field Museum of 
Natural History were also sought, the Seventh Circuit only ruled on the availability 
of the Persepolis Collection, housed at the University of Chicago on a long-term 
academic loan for study of Elamite writing. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
637 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 2011). This has unnerved many academics who argue 
that cultural property should not be subjected to lawsuits for purposes of fulfilling a 
court-ordered judgment for damages; they claim that this would detrimentally affect 
the practice of foreign nations loaning their cultural heritage to museums, 
universities, and the like. See, e.g., Sebastian Heath & Glenn M. Schwartz, Legal 
Threats to Cultural Exchange of Archaeological Materials, 113 AM. J.
ARCHAEOLOGY 459, 460-61 (2009); Alicia M. Hilton, Terror Victims at the Museum 
Gates: Testing the Commercial Activity Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act, 53 VILL. L. REV. 479, 517 (2008); On the Attachment of Cultural 
Objects to Compensate Victims of Terrorism, ARCHAEOLOGICAL INST. AM. (Feb. 9,
2009), https://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/AIAAttachment.pdf [https://perma.cc/
42P8-YBRK]. Academics also argue that allowing such a practice would violate the 
UNESCO Cultural Property Convention. See Claire R. Thomas, “That Belongs in a 
Museum!” Rubin v. Iran: Implications for the Persian Collection of the Oriental 
Institute of the University of Chicago, 31 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 257, 288 
(2009); see also Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation art. 1(2)(c), Nov. 16, 1945, 61 Stat. 2495, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 
[hereinafter UNESCO Constitution]; Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property 
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the 
plaintiffs could not satisfy their judgment against Iran through the 
attachment of the Persian artifacts in question.12 The court held that 
the use of the Persepolis Collection by the University of Chicago did 
not qualify as “commercial activity” engaged in by Iran, and 
therefore the artifacts could not be attached under § 1610(g) of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the FSIA).13 Thus, the court held 
that § 1610(g) does not offer a freestanding exception to execution 
immunity in cases of terrorism-related judgments,14 creating a circuit 
split with the Ninth Circuit and overruling two prior decisions by the 
Seventh Circuit.15 Presently, the case sits in the hands of the Supreme 
Court, where the justices must make the ultimate decision—
Does § 1610(g) limit terror victims’ recovery to only “commercial” 
property, or is § 1610(g) a freestanding exception?16
What scholarship does exist on the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act tends to focus primarily on what kinds of property 
constitute “commercial activity” under the commercial use exception 
to attachment and execution immunity.17 This Note does not discuss 
whether scholarly use of ancient artifacts constitutes commercial 
activity.18 Instead, this Note focuses on the language and legislative 
history of § 1610(g) and why the statute arguably abrogates the need 
for the sought-after property to be used for commercial activity in the 
United States.19 The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rubin v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran has the effect of making it nearly impossible for 
victims of state-sponsored terrorism to recover on judgments in cases 
where the foreign sovereign has few available assets.20 Rather, 
art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, 27 U.S.T. 37, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter UNESCO 
Cultural Property Convention].
12. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473-74 (upholding the lower court’s finding that 
the plaintiffs had “no statutory basis to execute on the artifacts”).
13. See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012).
14. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487; see also infra Section II.B (discussing the 
Seventh Circuit’s holding in further detail).
15. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
16. See id. (majority opinion), cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. June 
27, 2017) (No. 16-534).
17. See generally Hilton, supra note 11.
18. Though, necessarily, some discussion of the commercial use exceptions 
will be provided.
19. See infra Section IV.A (analyzing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) and what 
it means for terrorism victims).
20. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (finding that the 
majority’s interpretation of § 1610(g) “shelters from execution a wide range of 
assets of state sponsors of terrorism”).
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§ 1610(g) of the FSIA should be interpreted by the Supreme Court—
as it has been in prior Seventh and Ninth Circuit cases—as a 
freestanding exception for terrorism-related judgments, which would 
allow victims to fulfill their judgments against a broader range of 
foreign assets.21
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act and the statutes involving state-sponsored 
terrorism. Part II discusses the history of the Rubin plaintiffs’ quest 
to hold Iran accountable for the attack by Hamas and the Seventh 
Circuit’s most recent ruling against the Rubin plaintiffs; Part II also 
briefly analyzes the cases that were consequently overruled by the 
Seventh Circuit’s decision. Part III provides an overview of policy 
regarding the legislative purpose and history of § 1610(g). Finally, 
Part IV analyzes and ultimately proposes why the Supreme Court 
should hold that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to 
attachment and execution immunity in terrorism-related judgments. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
For much of American history, foreign countries were 
practically untouchable in the courtroom; United States citizens and 
the government alike could not bring any actions against foreign 
sovereigns.22 However, in the last sixty years there has been a great 
shift23—foreign countries, while enjoying the initial presumption of 
immunity, can now be sued in American courts under certain 
enumerated exceptions.24 One such exception may apply when the 
foreign sovereign is found to have sponsored and supported terrorist 
organizations and activities that harm American citizens.25
Nonetheless, hurdles remain; while American plaintiffs may succeed 
in suing a country for sponsoring terrorism and causing injury, the 
plaintiffs must further establish that the property they seek to fulfill 
their awarded judgments also satisfies additional statutory 
requirements.26 While certain provisions allow foreign property 
located within the United States to be collected upon, they fall short 
21. See infra Section IV.A.
22. See infra Section I.A.
23. See infra Section I.A.
24. See infra Section I.B.
25. See infra Section I.B.
26. See infra Section I.B.
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of completely ensuring that injured American plaintiffs will see any 
tangible relief.27
A. Concept and History of Foreign Sovereign Immunity in the 
United States
In the United States, foreign sovereign nations have generally 
enjoyed and been granted complete immunity from civil suits filed in 
United States courts.28 In the past, the Supreme Court went so far as 
to interpret this concept of foreign sovereign invulnerability as 
granting “virtual[] absolute immunity” to other foreign nations.29
However, this changed in 1952 when the State Department issued the 
so-called Tate Letter, in which the Department announced it would 
be abandoning its recognition of foreign countries’ absolute 
sovereign immunity.30 Following the issuance of the Tate Letter, 
federal courts began adopting a “restrictive view” of sovereign 
immunity, holding that foreign sovereigns could only be liable to suit 
27. See infra Section I.B.
28. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983); 
see also William P. Hoye, Fighting Fire With . . . Mire? Civil Remedies and the New 
War on State-Sponsored Terrorism, 12 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 105, 114 (2002) 
(indicating that “[s]overeign states historically enjoyed absolute immunity from civil 
liability under international law for all actions”). “The doctrine of foreign sovereign 
immunity developed as a matter of common law.” Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 
305, 311 (2010).
29. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486. The Supreme Court was referring to its 
ruling in Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812), which 
held that the United States lacked jurisdiction over a foreign country’s war ship that 
had come to port. See id. (citing Schooner Exchange, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 116).
30. See Robert M. Jarvis, The Tate Letter: Some Words Regarding Its 
Authorship, 55 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 465, 465 (2015). During a speech in front of the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1954, Jack B. Tate, the State 
Department’s acting legal adviser, explained that this change in policy was made 
after the Supreme Court delivered its opinion in Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 
U.S. 30 (1945). See id. at 471. In Hoffman, Chief Justice Harlan Stone said that “it is 
therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity which our government has seen fit 
to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which the government has not 
seen fit to recognize.” Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 35. In his speech, Mr. Tate indicated 
that with this language, the State Department felt there was “now support in policy 
and in law justifying a holding that the result should be in accordance with the 
restrictive theory, according to which trading states could no longer assert immunity 
to suits in our courts growing out of commercial activities.” Jarvis, supra note 30, at 
471 (quoting Jack B. Tate, Remarks to the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York (Apr. 15, 1954)).
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in the United States for their private or commercial activity.31
Nonetheless, because the Supreme Court narrowly held in Schooner 
Exchange v. M’Faddon that foreign sovereign immunity was not 
governed by the Constitution,32 federal courts generally deferred to 
the Executive Branch’s expertise on matters regarding whether to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over foreign countries.33
In the time period between the issuance of the Tate Letter and 
the passing of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in 1976, a two-
step procedure emerged for determining whether a foreign country 
was entitled to sovereign immunity.34 First, a diplomat representing 
the foreign country could formally entreat a “suggestion of 
immunity” from the State Department.35 If the Department granted 
such a request, then the foreign nation was immune from suit.36 But, 
if the Department declined to grant such immunity, then federal 
courts had the authority to decide if the foreign nation met all the 
criteria for sovereign immunity.37 In so determining, the federal 
courts would inquire as to whether the grounds for immunity were 
previously established and recognized by the State Department.38
31. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 709 (2004) (citing 
Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Changed Policy 
Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign Governments (May 19, 
1952), reprinted in 26 DEP’T. ST. BULL., June 1952, at 984-85). 
32. See Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486 (noting that in Schooner Exchange, the 
Court made clear that the immunity of foreign sovereigns “is a matter of grace and 
comity on the part of the United States”).
33. See id. at 487 (noting that even after the issuance of the Tate Letter, 
“initial responsibility for deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily 
upon the Executive acting through the State Department”); see also Ex parte
Republic of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1943) (“The case involves the dignity and 
rights of a friendly sovereign state, claims against which are normally presented and 
settled in the course of the conduct of foreign affairs by the President and by the 
Department of State.”). The foundation for Executive power over matters of 
international concern is rooted in Article II of the U.S. Constitution, which provides 
the President with the power “to make Treaties . . . [and] appoint Ambassadors,” as 
well as imposing the duty to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.” 
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
34. See Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311 (2010) (describing the 
procedure). 
35. Id. (quoting Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 581).
36. See id.
37. See Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. at 587. The federal courts also had the 
authority to determine whether foreign sovereign immunity applied when foreign 
nations failed to make a request for immunity from the State Department. See Hoye, 
supra note 28, at 115. 
38. See Samantar, 560 U.S. at 312 (citing Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 
324 U.S. 30, 36 (1945)).
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However, this procedure was extremely cumbersome and led to non-
uniform decisions among the various district and circuit courts.39
Therefore, Congress passed the FSIA in 1976, which both codified 
the restrictive view of the Tate Letter and transferred determinations 
of immunity from the Executive Branch to the federal courts.40
B. Statutory Framework of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Under the FSIA, foreign countries are presumed to be immune 
from lawsuits in the United States;41 however, this presumption is 
subject to certain enumerated exceptions.42 These exceptions 
primarily concern a foreign nation’s commercial activities that either 
occur in or directly affect the United States.43 Unlike those 
exceptions that deal with commercial activities, § 1605A of the 
FSIA, enacted in 2008,44 grants plaintiffs a cause of action against 
certain state-sponsors of terrorism so designated by the State 
Department.45 This section provides that a foreign nation will not be 
immune from suit if found by the courts to be responsible for 
personal injuries or death caused by a government agent committing 
acts of torture, extrajudicial killings, the sabotage of aircraft, taking 
39. See Hoye, supra note 28, at 115. “[Because the] initial responsibility for 
deciding questions of sovereign immunity fell primarily to the executive branch . . . 
foreign nations seeking immunity often placed diplomatic pressure on the U.S. State 
Department. Consequently, political considerations led to suggestions of immunity 
where immunity should not have been available.” Id.
40. See id.
41. See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976).
42. See id. (“Subject to existing international agreements to which the 
United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act a foreign state shall be 
immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States 
except as provided in [28 U.S.C. §§] 1605 to 1607 of this chapter.”).
43. See Hoye, supra note 28, at 116; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)-(3).
44. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 474 (7th Cir. 
2016) (stating that Section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 
replaced 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008)—the former terrorism exception—
with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008)); see also National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 338-44.
45. See § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). As of December 13, 2016, the State 
Department designates three countries as state-sponsors of terrorism: Iran, Sudan,
and Syria. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, U.S. DEP’T ST.,
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm [https://perma.cc/W5ZZ-F72N] (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017). Additionally, in order for plaintiffs to have a cause of action 
against a foreign nation, the plaintiffs must have been U.S. nationals, members of 
the U.S. armed forces, or the employees or contractors of the U.S. government at the 
time the terrorist act occurred. See § 1605A(a)(2)(ii).
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hostages, or providing material support or resources for such acts.46 It 
also creates a private right of action for money damages.47 If
plaintiffs succeed in their suit against a state-sponsor of terrorism 
and are awarded a judgment for money damages, the plaintiffs may 
then seek to “attach” the foreign nation’s property.48 In attaching the 
foreign nation’s property, the plaintiffs may, under § 1610(g), use the 
property in order to execute and collect on their awarded judgment.49
Section 1610(g) allows plaintiffs to attach and execute their 
judgment upon the foreign sovereign’s property or property of the 
state’s agencies or instrumentalities.50 This section does away with 
the so-called Bancec doctrine, a policy in which a foreign state and 
46. See § 1605A(a)(1). The foreign government agent must have been 
“acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency” at the time of 
the act for the terrorism exception to apply. See id.
47. See § 1605A(c); see also Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the
International Community: Civil Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle 
Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 307, 328-29 (2009) (describing the 
provisions of § 1605A in detail).
48. See § 1605A(g)(1) (“[T]he filing of a notice of pending action pursuant 
to [§ 1605A] . . . shall have the effect of establishing a lien of lis pendens upon any 
real property or tangible personal property that is (A) subject to attachment in aid of 
execution, or execution under [28 U.S.C. §] 1610 [2012]; (B) located within that 
judicial district; and (C) titled in the name of any defendant, or titled in the name of 
any entity controlled by any defendant if such notice contains a statement listing 
such controlled entity.”); Strauss, supra note 47, at 331-32 (explaining how 
§ 1605A(g)(1) protects and preserves a foreign nation’s property for purposes of 
attachment). Like sovereign immunity, a foreign nation’s property is presumed to be 
immune from attachment and execution; however, this is subject to certain 
enumerated exceptions. See § 1609 (“Subject to existing international agreements to 
which the United States is a party at the time of enactment of this Act the property in 
the United States of a foreign state shall be immune from attachment arrest and 
execution except as provided in [§] 1610.”). 
49. See § 1610(g) (“[T]he property of a foreign state against which a 
judgment is entered under [§] 1605A, and the property of an agency or 
instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or 
is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is subject to 
attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provided in 
this section.”). If plaintiffs previously received a judgment under § 1605(a)(7)—the 
former terrorism exception—the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 
provides that plaintiffs can have their judgments converted under § 1605A “so that 
judgment creditors [can] access the benefits of § 1610(g).” Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481.
50. See § 1610(g)(1); see also Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481 (explaining that 
Section 1610(g) “applies to execution proceedings to enforce judgments obtained 
under § 1605A and eases the collection process for victims of state-sponsored 
terrorism”). The National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 amended § 1610 to 
include § 1610(g). See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-181, § 1083, 122 Stat. 3, 341-42.
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its subsidiaries were presumed to be separate for execution 
purposes.51 Ordinarily, this presumption could only be rebutted if the 
plaintiffs successfully demonstrated that the foreign state was the 
alter ego of the instrumentality and that a recognition of separate 
corporate status for the instrumentality would either defraud or work 
an injustice on the plaintiffs.52 Now, under § 1610(g), the Bancec
doctrine is lifted for holders of judgments related to terrorism.53
Therefore, if a foreign sovereign is subject to a judgment granted 
under § 1605A, any property held in the United States by the foreign 
sovereign or its agencies and instrumentalities may be subject to 
attachment and execution, regardless of whether there is an alter ego 
relationship between the foreign sovereign and the agency or 
instrumentality, or whether the plaintiffs would suffer an injustice or 
be defrauded if the agency or instrumentality was given a separate 
corporate status.54
However, § 1610(g) allows plaintiffs who have an outstanding 
§ 1605A judgment to attach and execute on property of the foreign 
country “as provided in this section.”55 It is the “as provided in this 
section” language that Iran and the Rubin plaintiffs argued over in 
their most recent case; while Iran argued that this phrase limits the 
scope of § 1610(g) to only property that fulfills a commercial use 
exception elsewhere under § 1610,56 the Rubin plaintiffs argued it 
does no such thing and that § 1610(g) establishes a freestanding 
51. See Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the 
Modern Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 14 n.65 (2008). The Bancec doctrine 
is derived from First National City Bank v. Banco Para El Comercio Exterior de 
Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983). Id. at 13. This case established a presumption that 
instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns were distinct and independent from the 
foreign sovereign itself. Id. (citing Hyatt Corp. v. Stanton, 945 F. Supp. 675, 681 
(S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
52. See id. at 13-14 (citing Hyatt, 945 F. Supp. at 629).
53. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 474.
54. See § 1610(g)(1); see also Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481-83.
55. See § 1610(g)(1). Plaintiffs can attach and execute on such property:
as provided in this section, regardless of[:] (A) the level of economic 
control over the property by the government of the foreign state; (B) 
whether the profits of the property go to that government; (C) the 
degree to which officials of that government manage the property or 
otherwise control its daily affairs; (D) whether that government is the 
sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or (E) whether establishing 
the property as a separate entity would entitle the foreign state to 
benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations.
Id.
56. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484.
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exception to execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments.57
While arguably vague and ambiguous,58 there is no real consensus 
among the courts on what this language actually does.59 These five 
words are the lynchpin in deciding whether the Rubin plaintiffs can 
attach and execute their judgment upon the Persepolis Collection.60
II. HISTORY OF RUBIN AND THE FIGHT TO HOLD IRAN 
ACCOUNTABLE FOR HAMAS
For the last twenty years, the Rubin plaintiffs have persistently 
sought to hold the Iranian government responsible and accountable 
for causing their physical and emotional injuries.61 Facing hurdles 
and pitfalls along the way, the Rubin plaintiffs have not yet seen any 
tangible relief.62 In their latest attempt to satisfy their unfulfilled 
judgment against Iran, the Seventh Circuit ruled against the Rubin
plaintiffs and held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act cannot 
grant them the particular relief they seek.63 In so doing, the Seventh 
Circuit overruled two of its own prior cases64 and created a circuit 
split,65 making the need for a definitive answer by the Supreme Court 
all the more pressing.66
A. Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran: The Initial Quest 
In the aftermath of the deadly suicide bombing carried out by 
Hamas at a Jerusalem mall in September 1997, two groups of injured 
57. See Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors–Appellants at 24-25, Rubin 
v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1935).
58. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489-90 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“The details 
of the textual arguments are laid out well in [Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
825 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2016)] and [Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783 
(7th Cir. 2011)], and I will not repeat them. Both readings of the text, I believe, are 
reasonable, meaning that the text is ambiguous. The courts must choose between 
two statutory readings: one that favors state sponsors of terrorism, and another that 
favors the victims of that terrorism.”); see also Bennett, 825 F.3d at 961 (“We 
acknowledge that § 1610 as a whole is ambiguous.”).
59. See infra Section II.B (discussing in depth how different federal courts 
have come to conflicting conclusions about this issue).
60. See infra Section IV.A.
61. See infra Sections II.A, II.B.
62. See infra Section II.A.
63. See infra Section II.B.
64. See infra Subsections II.C.1, II.C.2.
65. See infra Section II.C.
66. See infra Section IV.A.
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American citizens—the Campuzano and Rubin parties—brought 
separate suits against Iran and its government agencies and officials 
for their responsibility in providing training and support to Hamas.67
The Campuzano plaintiffs sought to sue the Government of Iran, the 
Ministry of Information and Security (MOIS), and the Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards; the Rubin plaintiffs brought suit against the 
Government of Iran and MOIS, as well as Ayatollah Ali Hoseini 
Khamenei, Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and Ali Fallahian-
Khuzetani.68 Both groups of plaintiffs sued the Iranian defendants 
under § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA, which waives sovereign immunity 
for state-sponsors of terrorism.69 The Iranian defendants, though 
served with proper notice, failed to respond or appear in either case; 
accordingly, the plaintiffs were awarded default judgments by the 
Clerk of the Court.70 However, because the FSIA requires a court to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to the entrance of a default 
judgment,71 the D.C. District Court consolidated the Campuzano and 
Rubin cases and held such a hearing.72
67. See Campuzano v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 281 F. Supp. 2d 258, 260-
61 (D.D.C. 2003).
68. See id. at 261. Although not spelled out in Campuzano, the three Iranian 
officials were the Supreme Leader, the Iranian President, and the Iranian Minister of 
Information and Security, respectively. See Petitioners–Appellants’ Petition for 
Panel Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 
F.3d 470 (D.D.C. 2016) (No. 14-7193) (indicating in caption the offices that these 
individuals held). Rafsanjani, also holding the title of Ayatollah, died on January 8, 
2017; in an article lauding Rafsanjani’s career as an Iranian statesman and former 
president, a CNN contributor hailed him as “a man of peace.” Seyed Hossein 
Mousavian, Death of Iran’s Rafsanjani: Ex-President Was a Man of Peace, CNN
(Jan. 12, 2017, 8:13 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/10/opinions/rafsanjani-
seyed-hossein-mousavian/index.html [https://perma.cc/JY3J-WMBD].
69. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269. Section 1083 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act of 2008 replaced 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008)
with 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008). See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 
470, 481 (7th Cir. 2016).
70. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261.
71. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976) (“No judgment by default shall be 
entered by a court of the United States or of a State against a foreign state, a political 
subdivision thereof, or an agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, unless the 
claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the 
court.”).
72. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261. The court consolidated the two 
cases because they both arose out of the same incident—the bombing in 
Jerusalem—and involved common questions of law and fact. See id.; see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 42(a).
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At this hearing, the district court—looking to the elements of 
§ 1605(a)(7)73—determined the following: (1) the bombing was an 
extrajudicial killing; (2) Hamas, a non-state actor receiving material 
support or resources from Iran, was the group responsible for the 
deliberate bombing; (3) MOIS, along with senior Iranian leaders, 
provided such support to Hamas with the specific purpose that 
Hamas carry out the bombing; (4) Iran was a State Department-
recognized sponsor of terrorism at the time of the bombing; (5) the 
FSIA did not require that the plaintiffs afford Iran the opportunity to 
arbitrate because the attack did not occur in Iran; (6) the plaintiffs 
were American citizens on the day of the bombing; and (7) if a U.S. 
official, in his or her official capacity, provided material support to a 
terrorist organization like Hamas, he or she would be liable and 
unable to claim qualified immunity.74 The district court held that 
both the Campuzano and Rubin parties properly established a right to 
relief and granted default judgments against the Iranian defendants.75
The nine Rubin plaintiffs76 were collectively awarded $71.5 million 
73. At the time of the Campuzano decision, the D.C. Circuit interpreted 
§ 1605(a)(7) as requiring plaintiffs to prove with satisfactory evidence the following 
elements:
(1) that personal injury or death resulted from an act of torture, 
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, or hostage taking; (2) that the act 
was either perpetrated by a foreign state directly or by a non-state actor 
which receives material support or resources from the foreign state 
defendant; (3) the act or provision of material support or resources is 
engaged in by an agent, official, or employee of the foreign state while 
acting within the scope of his or her office, agency, or employment; (4) 
that the foreign state be designated as a state sponsor of terrorism either 
at the time the incident complained of occurred or was later so 
designated as a result of such act; (5) that if the incident complained of 
occurred within the foreign state defendant’s territory, plaintiff has 
offered the defendants a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the matter; 
(6) that either the plaintiff or the victim was a United States national at 
the time of the incident; (7) that similar conduct by United States 
agents, officials, or employees within the United States would be 
actionable.
Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269 (citing § 1605(a)(7) and § 1605 note); see also
Elahi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 124 F. Supp. 2d 97, 106-07 (D.D.C. 2000) 
(explaining what a claim under § 1605(a)(7) must contain “[i]n order to establish 
subject matter jurisdiction and state a claim”).
74. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70 (explaining how each 
element was fulfilled).
75. See id. at 279. 
76. See id. at 261. The plaintiffs were Jenny Rubin, Daniel Miller, Abraham 
Mendelson, Stuart Hersh, Noam Rozenman, Deborah Rubin, Renay Frym, Elena 
Rozenman, and Tzvi Rozenman. See id. Some of the plaintiffs’ injuries were 
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in compensatory damages; the five actually present at the bombings 
were also granted $37.5 million each in punitive damages.77 The 
three Campuzano plaintiffs78 were collectively awarded $39 million 
in compensatory damages, in addition to $37.5 million in punitive 
damages.79 But, nearly fifteen years after the D.C. Circuit awarded 
the default judgments, the Campuzano and Rubin parties have yet to 
see relief.80 However, the quest to hold Iran truly accountable for 
their sponsorship of terrorism continues to this day.81
B. Which Rubin? A Plethora of Collections Cases
Following the decision in Campuzano, the Rubin plaintiffs 
have brought numerous cases against Iran over the last decade, each 
time trying to attach and execute on various Iranian assets within the 
United States to fulfill their multi-million dollar judgment.82 The 
Rubin plaintiffs have tried—and failed—to attach and execute on 
domestic bank accounts used in the United States by Iranian 
consulates,83 as well as on Iranian antiquities in possession of the 
traumatic; Noam Rozenman, for example, suffered burns over forty percent of his 
body and suffered over 100 shrapnel wounds. See id. at 267.
77. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 456 F. Supp. 2d 228, 230 (D. 
Mass. 2006). Deborah Rubin, Renay Frym, Elena Rozenman, and Tzvi Rozenman 
were not present at the Jerusalem bombing, but were family members who suffered 
emotional injuries. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 267-68.
78. See Campuzano, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 261. The three Campuzano 
plaintiffs—Diana Campuzano, Avi Elishis, and Gregg Salzman—likewise suffered 
traumatic injuries; Diana Campuzano suffered such a severe skull fracture that her 
brain was leaking cerebral spinal fluid and required a craniotomy in which her skull 
was repaired with “mini plates, bone cement, and her own harvested tissue.” See id.
at 263-65.
79. See id. at 274-75, 279.
80. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 473 (7th Cir. 
2016). Admittedly, it is not exactly clear if the Campuzano plaintiffs have ever 
sought to collect on their judgment; cases following the 2003 decision of the D.C. 
District Court were filed on behalf of “Jenny Rubin et al.” and made no mention of
the three Campuzano plaintiffs. See, e.g., Rubin, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 228; Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549, 549 (N.D. Ill. 2005); Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, No. Civ.A. 01-1655(RMU), 2005 WL 670770, at *1 
(D.D.C. Mar. 23, 2005), vacated, 563 F. Supp. 2d 38 (D.D.C. 2008).
81. See infra Section II.B.
82. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473; see also cases cited supra note 80.
83. See Rubin, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 39. The two accounts were held by Bank 
of America under the names “Consulate General of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
Chicago” and “Consolate General Iran.” Rubin, 2005 WL 670770, at *1.
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Boston Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard University.84 They have 
been consistently impeded in their efforts to fully satisfy their 
judgments.85 The Rubin plaintiffs have even been hindered by other 
injured victims who hold judgments against Iran.86 However, it is 
their most recent courtroom endeavor that has caused such tumult 
and confusion over the proper interpretation of § 1610(g) of the 
FSIA.87
The most recent setback for the Rubin plaintiffs was handed 
down in July 2016 by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.88 The 
plaintiffs proposed three ways in which they could attach and 
execute upon Iranian artifacts located at the University of Chicago 
and the Field Museum of Natural History: (1) § 1610(a) of the FSIA, 
the commercial activity exception; (2) § 1610(g) of the FSIA, the 
terrorism exception; or (3) § 201 of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
of 2002 (TRIA).89 However, the Seventh Circuit found that there was 
no statutory basis to support the attachment and execution of the 
contested artifacts.90
Among their failed arguments, the Rubin plaintiffs contended 
that § 1610(g) provides a freestanding exception to attachment and 
execution immunity and thus does not impose the same limitations 
under § 1610(a) and (b); in other words, § 1610(g) does not require 
the plaintiffs to establish that the property at issue is being used for 
84. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 709 F.3d 49, 51 (1st Cir. 2013). 
The antiquities in possession of the Museum of Fine Arts and Harvard included 
“stone reliefs, sculptures, and archeological specimens” that originated near or 
within the current borders of Iran. Id.
85. See James A. Wawrzyniak, Jr., Rubin v. The Islamic Republic of Iran:
A Struggle for Control of Persian Antiquities in America, in YEARBOOK OF 
CULTURAL PROPERTY LAW 223, 226-27, 229-30 (Sherry Hutt & David Tarler eds., 
2008) (describing in further detail how the Rubin plaintiffs were unsuccessful in 
their efforts to attach and execute upon Iranian property).
86. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Memorandum of Law at 5 n.2, Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, 408 F. Supp. 2d 549 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (No. 1:03-CV-09370)
(noting that while the D.C. District Court had granted the Rubin plaintiffs’ motion 
for a writ of execution in Rubin, 2005 WL 670770, at *1-2, the plaintiffs were 
unable to receive any of the funds because they were “subject to a prior lien”).
87. See infra Section II.B.
88. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016).
89. See id. at 473; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting 
that the Seventh Circuit only ruled on the applicability of the Persepolis Collection 
at the University of Chicago).
90. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 473-74. While the court analyzed the three proposed 
avenues for relief, this Note focuses solely on the court’s analysis of the Rubin 
plaintiffs’ argument under 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012).
The Persepolis Complex 563
commercial activity.91 The plaintiffs came to this conclusion by 
looking to a recent Seventh Circuit ruling.92 Using Gates v. Syrian 
Arab Republic, the Rubin plaintiffs argued that the court already 
determined § 1610(g) to be a freestanding exception.93 In Gates, the 
Seventh Circuit held that judgment holders who try to attach and 
execute under § 1610(g) do not have to comply with the procedural 
requirements of § 1610(c).94 Section 1610(c), by its own language, 
exclusively pertains to the attachment and execution of commercial 
property under § 1610(a) and (b).95 In holding that § 1610(c) does 
not apply, the court in Gates recognized that § 1610(g) is 
substantially different from § 1610(a) and (b).96 The Rubin plaintiffs 
stressed this point, arguing that because the court had recognized that 
the execution process of § 1610(g) “is entirely distinct” from the 
processes under § 1610(a) and (b), the court had established 
§ 1610(g) as a freestanding exception.97
The Rubin plaintiffs also argued that if Congress intended to 
limit § 1610(g), Congress would have overtly and clearly referred to 
§ 1610(a) and (b), either by cross-referencing to those subsections or 
by explicitly limiting § 1610(g) to property used in commercial 
activity.98 Furthermore, they argued that interpreting § 1610(g) as a 
freestanding exception unlimited by § 1610(a) and (b) would be 
consistent with the legislative history and purpose of § 1610(g).99 To 
support this, the Rubin plaintiffs pointed to a 2007 report from the 
91. Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors–Appellants, supra note 57, at 
25.
92. See id. at 23 (citing Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568 (7th 
Cir. 2014)).
93. See id. (“Contrary to the Appellees’ arguments, this Court recently 
affirmed in Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic . . . that [§] 1610(g) is, in fact, a free-
standing exception that waives [execution] immunity for all terrorist-state assets.”).
94. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 575 (“Section 1610(g) is not mentioned in 
§ 1610(c). By its terms, then, § 1610(c) simply does not apply to execution or 
attachment under § 1610(g). That conclusion is also consistent with the more 
general tools of statutory interpretation and the structure of the FSIA.”).
95. See § 1610(c) (“No attachment or execution referred to in subsections 
(a) and (b) of this section shall be permitted until the court has ordered such 
attachment and execution after having determined that a reasonable period of time 
has elapsed following the entry of judgment and the giving of any notice required 
under section 1608(e) of this chapter.”).
96. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 576 (“Section § 1610(g) differs substantially 
from § 1610(a) and (b).”).
97. See Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors–Appellants, supra note 57,
at 24.
98. See id. at 27-28.
99. See id. at 24.
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United States House of Representatives, which states that § 1610(g) 
was intended and written to subject “any property interest” that a 
foreign country may hold to attachment and execution.100
However, the Seventh Circuit did not agree with the Rubin
plaintiffs’ arguments.101 The court noted that Gates never discussed 
whether § 1610(g) actually was a freestanding exception.102
Furthermore, in analyzing the “as provided in this section” language, 
the court found that this language would be superfluous if § 1610(g) 
stood alone.103 Thus, the court held that interpreting § 1610(g) as a 
freestanding exception would violate the “cardinal principle” of 
statutory construction—that is, a statute should be interpreted so as 
to not render any clause, sentence, or word superfluous.104 In so 
doing, the court overruled Gates and another similar Seventh Circuit 
case105 and created a circuit split with the Ninth Circuit.106 The Rubin 
plaintiffs have since appealed to the Supreme Court,107 asking the 
Court to determine if the Seventh Circuit got it right.108
100. See id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 110-477, at 1001 (2007) (Conf. Rep.)). 
101. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 487 (7th Cir. 
2016) (“Section 1610(g) is not itself an exception to execution immunity for 
terrorism-related judgments . . . . [Terrorism victims] must satisfy an exception to 
execution immunity found elsewhere in § 1610—namely, subsections (a) or (b).”).
102. Id. at 485 (“Gates assumes rather than decides the crucial antecedent 
question—that is, whether § 1610(g) is itself a freestanding exception to execution 
immunity. Instead, it simply describes subsection (g) in a way that implies an 
affirmative answer. . . . But nowhere does the Gates opinion grapple with the 
fundamental interpretive question presented here.”).
103. See id. at 484; see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Appellees at 23, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (No. 14-1935) (arguing that the “as provided in this section” language 
integrates “by reference the other requirements for attaching foreign state property 
provided under [§] 1610”).
104. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484 (quoting TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31
(2001)).
105. See id. at 487 (“To the extent that [Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 
F.3d 568 (7th Cir. 2014)] and [Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331 (7th 
Cir. 2015)] can be read as holding that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to 
execution immunity for terrorism-related judgments, they are overruled.”).
106. See id. at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
107. See id., cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3594 (June 27, 2017) (No. 16-534).
108. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 21, Rubin, 85 U.S.L.W. 3594 
(No. 16-534). On June 27, 2017, the Court granted this petition. See Rubin v. 
Islamic Republic of Iran, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-
files/cases/rubin-v-islamic-republic-of-iran-2/ [https://perma.cc/W5Q5-JYEN] (last 
visited Oct. 9, 2017).
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C. Overruled!: How Other Courts Interpreted Section 1610(g) Prior 
to Rubin
In holding that § 1610(g) does not provide a freestanding 
exception to attachment and execution immunity, the Seventh Circuit 
“turned the car around”—the court overruled two of its own previous 
cases and came to the opposite conclusion of another circuit.109 In 
Gates and Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, the Seventh Circuit had 
previously ruled that a § 1610(g) action did not need to comply with 
certain procedural requirements of the FSIA.110 The decision in 
Rubin also significantly deviated from the Ninth Circuit, which 
explicitly held that § 1610(g) was a freestanding exception in 
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran.111 The Seventh Circuit’s ruling 
has created much confusion and must be addressed.112
1. Seventh Circuit: Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic
In arguing that § 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to 
attachment and execution immunity, the plaintiffs in Rubin relied on 
the Seventh Circuit’s prior holding in Gates.113 The Gates case 
stemmed from a dispute between two separate groups of terrorism 
victims—the Gates and Baker parties—each seeking to satisfy their 
own judgments against Syria.114 The judgment awarded to the Gates
party stemmed from the kidnapping and murder of two American 
civilian contractors in 2004 by the terrorist group al-Qa’ida in Iraq, 
who received support from the Syrian government.115 The Baker
109. Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
110. See infra Subsections II.C.1, II.C.2.
111. See infra Subsection II.C.3.
112. See Case Comment, Foreign Relations Law–Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act Terrorism Exceptions–Seventh Circuit Holds that FSIA Does Not 
Provide Freestanding Basis to Satisfy Judgment Against State Sponsors of 
Terrorism.–Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), 130 
HARV. L. REV. 761, 761 (2016) [hereinafter Seventh Circuit Holds] (noting the “lack 
of clarity” surrounding this issue).
113. See Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 (7th Cir. 2014); 
see also supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
114. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 570. This Note will not delve into the details and 
analysis of the competing claims. Such analysis would detract from this Author’s 
focus on 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) and its applicability as a freestanding exception 
to attachment and execution immunity. 
115. See id.; see also Ch. 6 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 3
(noting that al-Qa’ida in Iraq renamed themselves in 2013 to the Islamic State in 
Iraq and the Levant—ISIL or ISIS for short).
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party’s judgment was awarded after the hijacking of an EgyptAir 
flight in 1985 by the Abu Nidal Organization,116 a Palestinian 
terrorist organization that also received support from Syria.117 Both 
parties sought to attach and execute their § 1605A judgments on 
Syrian assets located in the Northern District of Illinois.118
In the court’s analysis of § 1610(g) and its applicability to 
attachment and execution, the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
exception allowed a “much broader range” of foreign assets to be 
used for § 1605A judgment purposes.119 The court held that under 
§ 1610(g), attachment of foreign sovereign assets is allowed 
irrespective of whether the sovereign retains economic control over 
the assets, profits from the assets, manages the assets, dictates its 
“daily affairs,” or is the sole beneficiary.120 In holding that terrorism 
victims need not comply with the procedural notice requirements of 
§ 1610(c),121 the court understood that § 1610(g) was substantially 
different and provided for the attachment of a foreign sovereign’s 
assets regardless of whether the assets were used for commercial 
activity in the United States.122 In addition, the court stated that its 
interpretation of the law—that victims trying to attach and execute 
under § 1610(g) do not have to comply with the notice requirement 
116. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 570; see also Judith Miller, From Takeoff to 
Raid: The 24 Hours of Flight 648, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 1985), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1985/11/27/world/from-takeoff-to-raid-the-24-hours-of-
flight-648.html [https://perma.cc/7TGS-W7S3] (describing the hijacking in detail).
117. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 570; Abu Nidal Organization (ANO), aka Fatah 
Revolutionary Council, the Arab Revolutionary Brigades, or the Revolutionary 
Organization of Socialist Muslims, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/israel/abu-nidal-organization-ano-aka-fatah-revolutionary-
council-arab-revolutionary-brigades-revolutionary-organization-socialist-
muslims/p9153 [https://perma.cc/QN5Q-VQZF] (last updated May 27, 2009).
118. Gates, 755 F.3d at 570. The assets in question were bank accounts held 
at JP Morgan Chase Bank; one was an AT&T account that contained frozen funds 
owned by Syrian Telecom, and two others “contain[ed] blocked electronic funds 
transfers belonging to the Banque Centrale de Syrie.” Id. at 573-74.
119. Id. at 576.
120. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g)(1) (2012)).
121. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (explaining that because 
§ 1610(c) was specific in its applicability to only the commercial use exceptions of 
§ 1610(a) and (b), it did not apply to § 1610(g)).
122. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 576. (“Section 1610(g) differs substantially from 
§ 1610(a) and (b) . . . . Section 1610(g) provides that in cases of state-sponsored 
terrorism, assets of the defendant’s agencies and instrumentalities are subject to 
attachment and execution regardless of factors that would ordinarily insulate such 
assets in other contexts governed by § 1610(a) and (b).”).
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of § 1610(c)123—was consistent with the “broader legislative 
purpose” for which § 1610(g) was enacted in 2008.124 Such purpose 
was “to make it easier” for victims to satisfy their judgments against 
state-sponsors of terrorism.125
2. Seventh Circuit: Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic
Shortly after the Seventh Circuit ruled on Gates, the court once 
again addressed the question of how § 1610(g) should be properly 
interpreted.126 In Wyatt, the Gates party made a return appearance, 
this time being challenged by the Wyatt victims; both parties were
seeking to attach the same Syrian assets located in the Northern 
District of Illinois.127 The Wyatt group’s judgment stemmed from the 
1991 kidnapping of two biblical archaeologists in Turkey by the 
Kurdistan Workers’ Party,128 a terrorist organization that has a 
historically close relationship with the Syrian government.129 In a 
123. See id. at 575-76 (holding that only those trying to attach and execute 
under § 1610(a) and (b) need satisfy the requirements of § 1610(c)). “Surrounded by 
other references, Congress’ silence is a strong textual indication that § 1610(c) does 
not apply to efforts to enforce judgments under [28 U.S.C.] § 1605A [2008] through 
§ 1610(g).” Id. at 576.
124. Id. “Exempting attachments under § 1610(g), that is, attachments 
stemming from terrorism-related judgments, from § 1610(c)’s solicitous notice 
requirements is entirely consistent with the liberalizing purpose of the 2008 
Amendments.” Id. at 576-77.
125. Id. at 576 (citing In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. 
Supp. 2d at 58-63 (D.D.C. 2009)).
126. See Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 333 (7th Cir. 2015).
127. See id. at 334-35. In fact, the assets being fought over in Wyatt were the 
same assets fought over in Gates. See id. at 335-36; supra note 118 and 
accompanying text.
128. See Wyatt, 800 F.3d at 335. The archaeologists were on an “expedition 
searching for the remains of Noah’s Ark in eastern Turkey” when they were 
kidnapped. Five Kidnap Victims Fly Home After “Harrowing Experience”, UNITED 
PRESS INT’L (Sept. 23, 1991), http://www.upi.com/Archives/1991/09/23/Five-
kidnap-victims-fly-home-after-harrowing-experience/5441685598400/ 
[https://perma.cc/55R4-3273]. 
129. See Wyatt, 800 F.3d at 335; see also Damien McElroy, Syria and Iran 
“Backing Kurdish Terrorist Group,” Says Turkey, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 3, 2012), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/turkey/9518194/Syria-and-
Iran-backing-Kurdish-terrorist-group-says-Turkey.html [https://perma.cc/D6VX-
CJDC] (“‘It [is] known that the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] works arm in arm with 
Syria’s intelligence organisation,’ said Huseyin Celik, the deputy chairman of 
Turkey’s AK party. ‘[Bashar al-Assad, the President of Syria] is inclined to view 
Turkey’s foe, the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party], as a friend.’ . . . ‘Assad has been 
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move to usurp the Gates party’s attachment of the Syrian assets in 
question, the Wyatt group claimed that the Gates party failed to serve 
the Syrian government with notice of its judgment, as required under 
§ 1608(e).130 If this were true, it would mean that the Gates party 
could not correctly follow the procedural requirements of § 1610(c), 
and thus the Wyatt group would hold the only valid claim to the 
assets at issue.131
However, the Seventh Circuit pointed out that the Gates party 
was not seeking to execute its judgment under § 1610(c); rather, the 
party sought to execute under § 1610(g).132 Reaffirming its holding 
from Gates, the court reiterated that the procedural requirements of 
§ 1610(c) do not apply to attachment and execution under § 1610(g); 
rather, § 1610(c) only applies to judgments being executed under the 
commercial use exceptions—§ 1610(a) and (b).133 Once again, the 
Seventh Circuit stated that it came to this conclusion by looking to 
the language and structure of the FSIA, its legislative history, and the 
legislative purpose of the 2008 FSIA amendments.134 In short, the 
court reaffirmed its recognition of the substantial differences 
between § 1610(g) and the commercial use exceptions.135
cultivating the [Kurdistan Workers’ Party] since the 1980s to provide just this level 
of protection for his regime.’”). 
130. See Wyatt, 800 F.3d at 342; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1976) (“A 
copy of any such default judgment shall be sent to the foreign state or political 
subdivision in the manner prescribed for service in this section.”).
131. See Wyatt, 800 F.3d at 342. “The statutory consequence of failing to 
satisfy the service requirement in § 1608(e) is that plaintiffs with a judgment against 
a foreign state cannot obtain authorization under [28 U.S.C.] § 1610(c) [2012] to 
proceed to attachment and execution of that judgment.” Id. “If the Gates plaintiffs’ 
judgment, attachment, and execution are valid, then they plainly have priority over 
the Wyatt plaintiffs, who did not register a judgment and serve a citation to discover 
assets until nearly three years later.” Id.
132. See id. at 343 (“The Gates plaintiffs are seeking to execute a judgment 
for state-sponsored terrorism, so they may proceed through the execution provision 
specifically enacted for terrorism judgments, § 1610(g).”).
133. See id. (“As we held in Gates [v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568 
(7th Cir. 2014)], ‘§ 1610(c) simply does not apply to the attachment of assets to 
execute judgments under § 1610(g) for state-sponsored terrorism.’”).
134. See id.
135. See id.; see also Gates, 755 F.3d at 576 (recognizing that § 1610(g) 
“differs substantially” from the commercial use exceptions).
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3. Ninth Circuit: Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran
Utilizing the holdings in Gates and Wyatt—that § 1610(g) and 
the commercial use exceptions are substantially different—the Ninth
Circuit went even further, holding that § 1610(g) was a completely 
freestanding exception to attachment and execution immunity.136 In 
Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, ninety United States citizens and 
estate executors brought suit in order to seek fulfillment of their 
unsatisfied terrorism-related judgments against Iran.137 The sought-
after Iranian property was money contractually owed by Visa and 
Franklin Resources Inc. to Bank Melli, an instrumentality of Iran.138
Bank Melli, in attempts to defeat attachment and execution, argued 
that the “as provided in this section” language of § 1610(g) meant 
that the sought-after property needed to also fulfill the commercial 
use requirements of § 1610(a) and (b).139
The Ninth Circuit was not persuaded by Bank Melli’s 
argument.140 The court specifically held that § 1610(g) is a 
freestanding exception to attachment and execution immunity; 
therefore, the sought-after property in a § 1610(g) action does not 
need be used for a commercial activity within the United States.141
The Ninth Circuit reached this conclusion by looking to the subject 
matter that § 1610(g) covers.142 By its own express terms, § 1610(g) 
only applies in actions where the outstanding judgments were 
136. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 959-61 (9th Cir. 
2016) (“Two Seventh Circuit cases support our conclusion in this regard.”).
137. See id. at 954. The four parties—the Bennetts, the Greenbaums, the 
Acostas, and the Heisers—had been harmed by Iran in different terrorist events: (1) 
the Bennetts sued for a 2002 bombing at Hebrew University in Jerusalem; (2) the 
Greenbaums sued for a bombing of a Jerusalem restaurant in August 2001; (3) the 
Acostas sued for a 1990 shooting; and (4) the Heisers sued for the bombing of the 
Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
927 F. Supp. 2d 833, 835-36 (N.D. Cal. 2013). 
138. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 954.
139. See id. at 959 (“Bank Melli reasons that [§ 1610](g) applies only if 
some other part of § 1610 provides for attachment and execution. Bank Melli argues 
that its assets cannot be attached or executed upon because the assets at issue in this 
case were not ‘used for a commercial activity in the United States,’ a requirement in 
§ 1610(a), and Bank Melli has not itself ‘engaged in commercial activity in the 
United States,’ a requirement in § 1610(b).”).
140. See id.
141. See id. (“We hold that [§ 1610](g) contains a freestanding provision for 
attaching and executing against assets of a foreign state or its agencies or 
instrumentalities. . . . To the extent that [§ 1610](g) is inconsistent with [§ 1610](a) 
or (b), [§ 1610](g) governs because the particular . . . controls over the general.”).
142. See id.
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entered under § 1605A.143 In turn, § 1605A revokes a foreign state’s 
sovereign immunity for claims of personal injury or death caused by 
extrajudicial killings or the provision of material support to a 
terrorist organization.144 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that because 
such claims do not arise from commercial activity, but rather from 
terrorist acts, § 1610(g) is not governed by the commercial use 
requirements of § 1610(a) and (b).145
Bank Melli also argued that reading § 1610(g) as a freestanding 
exception would render other subsections of § 1610 superfluous; 
however, the Ninth Circuit did not agree.146 Rather, the court held 
that if § 1610(g) was interpreted as to require a foreign state’s 
property be used for commercial activity, or that the foreign state’s 
instrumentality be engaged in commercial activity in the United 
States, then courts would have to read in a limitation to § 1610(g) 
that Congress itself did not place.147 Section 1610(g) specifically 
states that “the property” of a foreign state or its agencies or 
instrumentalities is subject to attachment and execution.148 Given this 
exclusive language, the Ninth Circuit understood this to mean that 
143. See id.; see also § 1610(g).
144. See § 1605A(a)(1); see also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
145. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959-61.
146. See id. at 960 (“Bank Melli argues . . . that our reading of § 1610(g) 
renders § 1610(a)(7) and (b)(3) superfluous. But the tension works in the opposite 
direction.”). Section 1610(a)(7) reads: 
The property in the United States of a foreign state . . . used for a 
commercial activity in the United States, shall not be immune from 
attachment in aid of execution, or from execution, upon a judgment 
entered by a court of the United States or of a State after the effective date 
of this Act, if . . . the judgment relates to a claim for which the foreign 
state is not immune under section 1605A . . . regardless of whether the 
property is or was involved with the act upon which the claim is based.
§ 1610(a)(7). Section 1610(b)(3) reads: 
In addition to subsection (a), any property in the United States of an 
agency or instrumentality of a foreign state engaged in commercial 
activity in the United States shall not be immune from attachment in aid of 
execution, or from execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the 
United States or of a State after the effective date of this Act, if . . . the 
judgment relates to a claim for which the agency or instrumentality is not 
immune by virtue of section 1605A of this chapter . . . regardless of
whether the property is or was involved in the act upon which the claim is 
based.
§ 1610(b)(3).
147. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960 (citing United States v. Temple, 105 U.S. 
(9 Otto) 97, 99 (1881)).
148. See § 1610(g)(1).
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Congress did not intend § 1610(g) to be limited only to commercially 
related property.149 Thus, in light of the Seventh Circuit’s holdings in 
Gates and Wyatt, the text of § 1610, and the congressional purpose 
of easing the recovery process for victims with unfulfilled 
judgments,150 the Ninth Circuit held that § 1610(g) is clearly a 
freestanding exception to attachment and execution immunity.151
And so lies the confusion: While Gates and Wyatt both 
recognize that § 1610(g) is substantially different from the 
commercial use exceptions and is not subject to the same procedural 
requirements,152 and Bennett expressly held that § 1610(g) does not 
require the sought-after property to be used for commercial activity 
in the United States,153 the Seventh Circuit came to the opposite 
conclusion.154 With its decision in Rubin, the Seventh Circuit turned 
over the tables upon which the Rubin plaintiffs relied.155 This 
149. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960 (“Section 1610(g)(1) provides that ‘the 
property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under [§] 1605A, and 
the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, . . . is subject to 
attachment in aid of execution, and execution.’ . . . Thus, Congress did not limit the 
type of property subject to attachment and execution under § 1610(g) to property 
connected to commercial activity in the United States. The only requirement is that 
property be ‘the property of’ the foreign state or its instrumentality.”).
150. See id. at 961-62. The court acknowledged that “§ 1610 as a whole is 
ambiguous,” and thus considered the legislative history behind its passing. See id. at
961. The court held that it was “quite clear that Congress meant to expand 
successful plaintiffs’ options for collecting judgments against state sponsors of 
terrorism.” Id. For further discussion of the legislative history and purpose behind 
§ 1610(g), see infra Section III.A.
151. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960. Bank Melli has subsequently appealed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision and filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme 
Court. Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949 (9th Cir. 2016), petition for 
cert. filed sub nom. Bank Melli v. Bennett (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016) (No. 16-334). In its
petition, Bank Melli asks the Court to decide: 
Whether § 1610(g) establishes a freestanding exception to sovereign 
immunity, as the Ninth Circuit held below, or instead merely supersedes 
Bancec’s presumption of separate status while still requiring a plaintiff to 
satisfy the criteria for overcoming immunity elsewhere in § 1610, as the 
Seventh Circuit has held and the United States has repeatedly urged.
Id. at (i). Following the Ninth Circuit ruling in Bennett, the D.C. Circuit held that 
§ 1610(g) permits the execution of all property owned by a foreign state-sponsor of 
terrorism. See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 831 F.3d 470, 483 (D.C. Cir. 
2016).
152. See supra Subsections II.C.1, II.C.2.
153. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
154. See supra Section II.B. 
155. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 766 (“[T]error victims’ 
already-fraught path to recovery becomes if anything more complicated, expensive, 
and painful when the availability of assets turns on the current positions of different 
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important statutory provision—intended to ease victims’ plight156—is 
currently in judicial limbo.157 Now that the issue lies in the lap of the 
Supreme Court,158 the Rubin plaintiffs and other victims may finally 
have an answer.
III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, POLICY, AND A NEW HOPE 
While the Seventh Circuit did not look to the legislative history 
and purpose of § 1610(g) in Rubin,159 the decisions in Gates, Wyatt,
and Bennett were couched in such analysis.160 In passing the 
amendment that codified § 1610(g), members of Congress were 
concerned about how difficult it was for victims to satisfy their 
outstanding terrorism-related judgments.161 By introducing § 
1610(g), Congress sought to facilitate the process and afford victims 
a wider range of assets to attach and execute upon.162 This mission of 
Congress—to help victims hold state-sponsors of terrorism truly 
accountable—continues to this day.163 The Supreme Court has also 
seemed to recognize this mission164—a ray of hope for the Rubin
plaintiffs. 
A. Section 1610(g) Was Intended to “Significantly Expand” the 
Number and Types of Assets Available to Satisfy Terrorism-
Related Judgments 
Prior to the enactment of § 1610(g) of the FSIA, most victims 
of terrorism who held judgments against foreign state-sponsors were 
courts in different jurisdictions rather than on the nature of the assets or the nature of 
the victims’ claims.”).
156. See infra Section III.A.
157. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 761 (“The lack of clarity 
in attachment provisions of the FSIA has forced courts to provide piecemeal 
solutions to an important policy question, to the detriment of all the objectives 
underlying the statute.”).
158. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2016), 
cert. granted, 85 U.S.L.W. 3594 (U.S. June 27, 2017) (No. 16-534).
159. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 481-87.
160. See supra Section II.C (noting that the courts in all three decisions 
found that the history and purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) supported their 
conclusions).
161. See infra Section III.A.
162. See infra Section III.A.
163. See infra Section III.B.
164. See infra Section III.C.
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engaged in “a long, bitter, and often futile quest for justice.”165 What 
§ 1605A and its predecessor statute created was an anomaly—while 
state-sponsors of terrorism were no longer immune from judgment, 
they were practically and essentially immune from collection.166 This 
was due primarily to two factors: (1) state-sponsors of terrorism 
owned little property that was both located within the United States 
and satisfied the commercial use requirements of § 1610,167 and (2) 
those few assets that met those requirements were blocked by the 
United States government and thus were out of reach to plaintiffs.168
Victims of state-sponsored terrorism were thus stuck between a rock 
and a hard place—they could either be content solely with the fact 
that Iran and other foreign sponsors were held legally responsible for 
such horrific acts of terrorism, or they could fight a potentially 
fruitless war for any number of years in order to see even a dime of 
their justly received judgments.169 Without an ability to recover their 
165. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 45-
46, 49 (D.D.C. 2009). See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 761 (noting that 
the Court in In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litigation coined this “The 
Never-Ending Struggle to Enforce Judgments Against Iran” (citation omitted)).
166. See In re Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 53; see also Bennett v. Islamic 
Republic of Iran, 799 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2015). 
167. See In re Iran, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 52-53 (“The relevant exceptions to 
the general rule of immunity from the attachment or execution are listed in [28 
U.S.C.] § 1610 [2012]. Prior to the enactment of [the 2008 FSIA amendments], 
however, these exceptions to the general rule of immunity for foreign government 
property were limited almost exclusively to property relating to the commercial 
activities of the foreign sovereign within the United States. . . . Given the lack of 
formal relations between the United States and Iran, these provisions have been of 
little utility to the judgment creditors of Iran in FSIA terrorism cases.”).
168. See id. at 52 (“What few assets of Iran that might be found within 
jurisdiction of the United States . . . are a subject to a dizzying array of statutory and 
regulatory authorities . . . [M]uch like the assets of other state sponsors of terrorism, 
most of Iran’s known property or interests in property are blocked, i.e., frozen, or 
otherwise regulated under any number of United States sanctions programs.”). 
Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA) to free those 
blocked assets for use to satisfy unfulfilled 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (repealed 2008) 
and 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2008) judgments. See id. at 57-58.
169. See id. at 55 (“Allowing plaintiffs to go forward with suits under 
§ 1605(a)(7) [or § 1605A] while not freeing up Iran’s assets to satisfy those 
judgments under § 1610, or through the release of blocked assets under United 
States’ control, was a quintessential example of the federal government promising 
with one hand what it takes away with the other.”).
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judgments from state-sponsors of terrorism, victims would often 
languish for years in a purgatorial state.170
In attempts to fix this frustrating problem and alleviate the 
migraine for victims of state-sponsored terrorism, Congress amended 
the FSIA in 2008 by adding § 1610(g), the core purpose of which 
was to “significantly expand” the number of assets available for 
attachment and execution purposes.171 Because the purpose of the 
original terrorism exception itself was to deter state-sponsors of 
terrorism172 and compensate victims,173 these 2008 amendments no 
doubt further strengthened those ideals. Senator Frank Lautenberg, a 
Democrat from New Jersey,174 authored four of the 2008 FSIA 
amendments, including what became § 1610(g);175 in the Senator’s 
statements regarding the passage of the amendments, Senator 
Lautenberg repeatedly emphasized that the primary purpose of 
§ 1610(g) was to “provid[e] justice” to victims who suffered as a 
result of terrorist actions.176 According to Senator Lautenberg, 
170. See Hilton, supra note 11, at 480 (noting that “more than ten years after 
the [terrorist attack], the plaintiffs in [Rubin] have yet to realize any meaningful 
recovery”).
171. Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 807 F. Supp. 2d 9, 26 
(D.D.C. 2011). See also Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318 n.2 
(2016).
172. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 
1998) (discussing how Congress allowed for punitive damages so that “the 
exception for immunity [would] have the desired deterrent effect”); see also 
Thomas, supra note 11, at 283 (discussing that “one of the main reasons for the 
terrorist state exception to FSIA [was] that terrorist states should be forced to pay for 
their action in order to deter them from future terrorist acts”).
173. See Ilana Arnowitz Drescher, Note, Seeking Justice for America’s 
Forgotten Victims: Reforming the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Terrorism 
Exception, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 791, 796 (2012).
174. See Adam Clymer, Frank Lautenberg, New Jersey Senator in His 5th 
Term, Dies at 89, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/04/
nyregion/frank-lautenberg-new-jersey-senator.html [https://perma.cc/B79U-GQVY].
175. See 154 CONG. REC. 499-500 (2008) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
The other three amendments sought to “increase oversight of our country’s 
economic and security assistance to Afghanistan by creating a Special Inspector 
General,” “prevent military health care fees through the TRICARE program from 
rising,” and “increase accountability and planning for safety and security at the 
Warren Grove Gunnery Range in New Jersey.” Id. Section 1083 of the Act amended 
28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012) to include § 1610(g). See also Pub. L. No. 110-181, 
§ 1083, 122 Stat. 338, 338-341 (2008).
176. See 154 CONG. REC. 500 (2008) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg). 
According to Senator Lautenberg, the impetus for this legislation was an attack on a 
U.S. Marine compound at the Beirut International Airport in Lebanon on October 
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another impetus and goal of the amendment was to “facilitate” the 
collection of damages awarded to victims.177 Furthermore, Senator 
Lautenberg stated that § 1610(g) would allow for the attachment of 
assets if the property at issue and the foreign state-sponsor of 
terrorism satisfied a “simple ownership” test.178 In another statement 
given by co-author Senator Carl Levin, a Democrat from 
Michigan,179 the intent of § 1610(g) was to “strengthen[] 
mechanisms” so that victims could collect on their judgments.180 A
Conference Report from the House of Representatives181 went even 
further, indicating that the Senate’s amendment permitted all 
property that the foreign country had “a beneficial ownership” in to 
be targeted for execution and fulfillment of terrorism-related 
judgments.182
The 2008 FSIA amendments, including § 1610(g), enjoyed 
widespread, bipartisan support in Congress.183 Academics lauded the 
amendments as a “novel approach” to the challenge of terrorism and 
23, 1983. See id. at 501. The attack was carried out by Hezbollah, again funded by 
Iran, and killed 241 military personnel. See id.
177. Id. at 500. Indeed, the need for facilitation is arguably urgent and 
necessary. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 766 (noting that the Rubin
plaintiffs’ saga has lasted decades, having “litigated three major efforts at 
attachment through three district and two appeals courts”).
178. See 154 CONG. REC. 500 (2008) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
179. See MJ Rosenberg, Carl Levin Retires: The Senate’s Last of the Just,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 16, 2014, 03:07 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mj-
rosenberg/carl-levin-retires-the-se_b_6335662.html [https://perma.cc/WNP9-7CUR] 
(last updated Feb. 15, 2015) (noting Senator Levin is “the longest serving senator in 
Michigan’s history”). 
180. 154 CONG. REC. 499 (2008) (statement of Sen. Levin).
181. See H.R. REP. 110-477, at 1001 (2007) (Conf. Rep.).
182. Id. While this amendment was not included in the House’s version of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th 
Cong. (2007), the House adopted the Senate’s language into their own bill with 
limited changes. Id. The only limitation the House gave the provision, regarding 
how “any property” could be subject to execution, was that “the provision would not 
supersede the court’s authority to appropriately prevent impairment of interests in 
property held by other persons who are not liable to the claimants in connection with 
the terrorist act.” Id. at 1001-02. In other words, third parties who may be innocent 
joint venture partners with the foreign sovereign would not have their property taken 
in aid of fulfilling a judgment against the foreign state-sponsor of terrorism. See id.
183. See Danica Curavic, Note, Compensating Victims of Terrorism or 
Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy – The Unintended Consequences of the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions, 43 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 381, 389 
(2010) (citing David M. Herszenhorn, After Veto, House Passes a Revised Military 
Policy Measure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2008, at A28) (noting that the bill passed by 
wide margins in both houses).
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even suggested that countries around the world should adopt similar 
legislation.184 Furthermore, with regards to § 1610(g), academics 
understood the section as rendering any foreign-owned property 
within the United States capable of being attached and executed 
upon, including cultural artifacts.185 Similarly, § 1610(g) has been 
understood by courts to “significantly ease[]” the enforcement of 
§ 1605A judgments.186 Furthermore, courts have recognized the 
“broad remedial purposes” Congress wanted to realize through 
enacting the 2008 amendments to the FSIA.187
B. Congress Continues Its Mission to End “The Never-Ending 
Struggle”
Since the introduction of the 2008 FSIA amendments, 
Congress has passed several additional bills relating to victims of 
state-sponsored terrorism. Most recently, Congress passed the Justice 
Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA), a measure meant to 
significantly narrow the scope of a foreign sovereign’s immunity 
when the nation is found responsible for acts of international 
terrorism and for torts committed by its officials and employees.188
184. Debra M. Strauss, Reaching Out to the International Community: Civil 
Lawsuits as the Common Ground in the Battle Against Terrorism, 19 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 307, 307-08 (2009).
185. See Curavic, supra note 183, at 390 (citing On the Attachment of 
Cultural Objects, supra note 11) (understanding that 28 U.S.C. §1610(g) (2012) 
“renders any grant of immunity by the State Department to loans of cultural objects 
from a foreign state sponsor of terrorism ineffectual”); see also Heath & Schwartz, 
supra note 11, at 459-61 (discussing how the MET Museum believed the 2008 
amendments would allow for cultural artifacts to be attached by those with claims 
against Syria); Andrew Lyubarsky, Note, Clearing the Road to Havana: Settling 
Legally Questionable Terrorism Judgments to Ensure Normalization of Relations 
Between the United States and Cuba, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 458, 465 (2016) (Section 
1610(g) “subject[s] virtually all property of a foreign state and its agencies or 
instrumentalities to attachment and execution pursuant to terrorism judgments”).
186. Calderon-Cardona v. Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, 723 F. 
Supp. 2d 441, 458 (D.P.R. 2010). See also Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of 
Iran, 807 F. Supp. 2d 9, 16 (D.D.C. 2011).
187. In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 64 
(D.D.C. 2009). See also Estate of Heiser, 807 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
188. See Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 114-222
(2016); see also Jennifer Steinhauer, Mark Mazzetti & Julie Hirschfeld Davis, 
Congress Votes to Override Obama Veto on 9/11 Victims Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/29/us/politics/senate-votes-to-override-
obama-veto-on-9-11-victims-bill.html [https://perma.cc/8K6G-X8CL] (“‘This is a 
decision I do not take lightly,’ said Senator Chuck Schumer, Democrat of New 
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Furthermore, in recognizing that victims of terrorism still struggle to 
satisfy their awarded judgments, Congress established the U.S. 
Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund, which provides 
compensation to certain eligible victims.189 By passing these and 
other laws similarly dedicated to alleviating the suffering of 
victims,190 Congress has continued to demonstrate its support for the 
plight of victims of state-sponsored terrorism. 
C. A New Hope for Rubin: The Triumph of Bank Markazi v. 
Peterson
The fact remains that even with congressional efforts to 
alleviate the problem, most victims have not yet successfully seen 
fulfillment of their terrorism-related judgments;191 plaintiffs have 
faced many “practical and legal difficulties” in trying to enforce their 
judgments.192 However, in Bank Markazi v. Peterson, the Supreme 
Court gave relief to over 1,000 victims who were killed or wounded, 
or who suffered as the result of various terrorist acts sponsored by 
Iran.193 Though the Court’s decision was primarily rooted in a 
York, one of the legislation’s authors. ‘This bill is near and dear to my heart as a 
New Yorker, because it would allow the victims of 9/11 to pursue some small 
measure of justice, finally giving them a legal avenue to pursue foreign sponsors of 
the terrorist attack that took from them the lives of their loved ones.’”).
189. See 34 U.S.C. 20144 (2015); United States Victims of State Sponsored 
Terrorism Fund, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/criminal-mlars/usvsst 
[https://perma.cc/D8QW-D6RL] (last updated Jan. 26, 2017). The fund establishes 
“for the first time a victims’ fund of $1 billion, which will be drawn from penalties 
paid by the Paris-based BNP Paribas for violating sanctions against Iran, Sudan, and 
Cuba.” Jonathan Broder, U.S. State-Sponsored Terrorism Victims Can Finally 
Expect Some Compensation, NEWSWEEK (Jan. 5, 2016, 8:44 AM), 
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/01/15/dont-kill-these-lawyers-411566.html 
[https://perma.cc/FG24-9S5Y].
190. See, e.g., S. 2909, 114th Cong. (2016); H.R. 3394, 114th Cong. (2016).
Both are titled “Clarifying Amendment to Provide Terrorism Victims Equity Act,” 
and they each seek to amend § 201(d) of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 
2002—codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1610 note (2012)—so as to allow seized or frozen 
assets to be attached for judgment execution. See S. 2909; H.R. 3394. While the 
future of these bills remains uncertain in this new Congressional session, 
Representative Bill Posey plans on reintroducing the House bill this session. 
Telephone Interview with Brian, Staff Member, Office of Representative Bill Posey 
(Feb. 7, 2017).
191. See supra notes 165-170 and accompanying text.
192. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1317-18 (2016).
193. See id. at 1316. The question before the Supreme Court was whether a 
provision in the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 
U.S.C. § 8772 (2012)—which would allow plaintiffs to attach $1.75 billion in bonds 
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separation-of-powers question,194 the Supreme Court may have given 
the Rubin plaintiffs a ray of light in their own quest against Iran. In 
the Court’s majority opinion,195 the Court recognized that when the 
terrorism exception to the FSIA was originally enacted, the only 
property plaintiffs could attach for execution purposes had to be 
owned by the foreign state, located within the United States, and 
used for commercial activities.196 However, the Court noted that with 
the passing of § 1610(g), Congress expanded the availability of 
assets owned by the foreign state-sponsor of terrorism or the 
sovereign’s agencies or instrumentalities.197 This, combined with the 
Court’s recognition that victims who hold terrorism-related 
judgments face many “practical and legal difficulties” in enforcing 
their judgments, gives the impression that the Supreme Court will, at 
the very least, grant the Rubin plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of 
certiorari. 198
By passing consistent legislation aimed at aiding victims of 
terrorism, members of Congress have made it their mission to ensure 
foreign state-sponsors of terrorism are held truly accountable.199
Congress, with the passage of § 1610(g), sought to allow for a wider 
range of foreign property to be attached for execution purposes, thus 
alleviating many victims’ problems in achieving relief.200 In 
recognizing that Congress has continually sought to expand the relief 
available to victims of state-sponsored terrorism,201 the Supreme 
Court has arguably signaled that they are open to entertaining the 
Rubin plaintiffs’ argument—that § 1610(g) is a freestanding 
belonging to Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran—violated the separation of 
powers “by purporting to change the law for, and directing a particular result in, a 
single pending case.” Id. at 1316-17.
194. See id. at 1317. The Court held that § 8772 did not violate the 
separation of powers because it was not directed at one particular judgment against 
Iran, but rather allowed for those particular bonds to be used “to satisfy any
judgment” against Iran for judgments awarded under 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2012) and 
its predecessor. Id. (citing § 8772(a)(1)).
195. The Court’s majority opinion was authored by Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg. See id. at 1316. 
196. See id. at 1318 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1610(a)(7), (b)(3) (2012)).
197. See id. at 1318 n.2 (“Again expanding the availability of assets for 
postjudgment execution, Congress, in 2008, amended the FSIA to make available 
for execution the property (whether or not blocked) of a foreign state sponsor of 
terrorism, or its agency or instrumentality, to satisfy a judgment against that state.”).
198. See id. at 1317-18.
199. See supra Section III.B.
200. See supra Section III.A.
201. See supra Section III.C.
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exception to attachment and execution immunity and allows 
plaintiffs to fulfill their outstanding judgments upon non-commercial 
property.202
IV. SECTION 1610(G) SHOULD PROVIDE A FREESTANDING 
EXCEPTION FOR TERRORISM-RELATED CASES
At the moment, the Rubin plaintiffs are waiting to present their 
case and cause to the Supreme Court.203 Because the Seventh Circuit 
so drastically split with the Ninth Circuit in its interpretation of 
§ 1610(g)—that § 1610(g) is not a freestanding exception to 
attachment and execution immunity, and all sought-after foreign
property should be used for commercial activity in the United 
States—the Supreme Court must intervene.204 In deciding this case, 
the Court needs to give substantial weight to the intent of Congress 
and the purpose for which § 1610(g) was dedicated205 and should 
conclude that § 1610(g) does allow for the attachment of non-
commercial property.206 While there are compelling 
counterarguments against such a reading, they are ultimately 
unconvincing.207 Furthermore, this is an opportune moment for the 
Supreme Court to clarify and decide this issue, for the question as to 
how § 1610(g) best serves languishing victims of state-sponsored 
terrorism will not be one that goes quietly into that good night.208
A. The Seventh Circuit’s Current Interpretation of § 1610(g) Fails to 
Fulfill the Stated Purpose for the 2008 FSIA Amendments; The 
Supreme Court Must Rectify This
The law is missing a definitive ruling on whether § 1610(g) 
establishes a freestanding exception for execution on judgments 
awarded under § 1605A,209 or if the “as provided in this section” 
language limits the subsection’s scope.210 As it stands, victims of 
202. See SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 108.
203. See id.
204. See supra Sections II.B, II.C.
205. See supra Section III.A; see also infra Section IV.A.
206. See infra Section IV.A.
207. See infra Section IV.B.
208. See infra Section IV.C.
209. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 489 (7th Cir. 
2016) (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012); see also Brief for the United States, 
supra note 103, at 13 (“By its plain text, [28 U.S.C. §] 1610(g) [2012] makes clear 
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terrorism who seek to satisfy their outstanding judgments are able to 
do in one Circuit what they cannot in another.211 A Supreme Court 
ruling as to the proper interpretation of § 1610(g) will affect the lives 
of those who have been seeking for years to collect from foreign 
state-sponsors of terrorism and those who have been consistently 
thwarted in their efforts to do so.212 Such a decision may also make 
the lives of future victims—for in this day and age, there will 
unfortunately be future victims of terrorism213—easier to seek 
retribution from such sponsoring countries.214
In Rubin, Iran and the United States Executive Branch argued 
that § 1610(g) is limited by the “as provided in this section” 
language to include only property used for commercial activity in the 
United States.215 However, the Rubin plaintiffs argued against such 
an interpretation, instead asserting that § 1610(g) applies to any
property owned by the foreign state-sponsor of terrorism.216 Given 
the differing opinions and the circuit split between the various lower 
courts as to how § 1610(g) and the “as provided in this section” 
language should be interpreted,217 the text of § 1610(g) is ambiguous 
that it applies only where property is otherwise attachable ‘as provided in this 
section.’”).
211. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 766 (noting that the 
circuit split “renders many assets unavailable for seizure in terrorism cases in the 
Seventh Circuit—though not in the Ninth”).
212. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“As dry and 
technical as that sounds, the issue has important practical consequences for victims 
of state-sponsored terrorism.”); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 571 
(7th Cir. 2014) (rev’d by Rubin, 830 F.3d at 487) (noting the confusion over the 
exceptions to attachment and execution immunity, and how “victims of terror can 
then find themselves pitted in a cruel race against each other—a race to attach any 
available assets to satisfy the judgments . . . [that] can be satisfied only at the 
expense of other terrorism victims”); Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 765 
(noting “The Never-Ending Struggle” victims are forced to undergo in order to 
enforce judgments against state-sponsors of terrorism).
213. See Ch. 6 Foreign Terrorist Organizations, supra note 3 (listing fifty-
eight foreign organizations as “U.S. Government Designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations”).
214. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
215. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 484 (quoting § 1610(g)). The same argument 
was made by Bank Melli in Bennett. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 
F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 2016).
216. See Reply Brief for the Judgment Creditors–Appellants, supra note 57,
at 2. 
217. § 1610(g). See also supra Sections II.B, II.C.
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at best.218 In such a situation, the Supreme Court should look to the 
legislative history and statutory purpose behind § 1610(g).219
Based upon the legislative history and statutory purpose of 
§ 1610(g), Congress intended § 1610(g) to allow for the attachment 
of any property owned by the foreign sovereign or its 
instrumentality.220 In amending the FSIA in 2008 to include 
§ 1610(g), Congress sought to alleviate the many difficulties victims 
face in satisfying their outstanding terrorism-related judgments.221
The senators who sponsored the amendments made it clear that 
§ 1610(g) was intended not only to facilitate the collections process 
for victims, but to significantly expand the amount and type of assets 
available to them.222 Based on the record, there is nothing that would 
indicate Congress’s intent to limit § 1610(g) to only commercial 
property.223 In addition, given that § 1605A and its predecessor 
statute were intended to deter foreign nations from sponsoring 
terrorist organizations,224 allowing victims to attach and execute upon 
218. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 489 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“Both readings of 
the text, I believe, are reasonable, meaning that the text is ambiguous.”); Bennett,
825 F.3d at 961 (“We acknowledge that [28 U.S.C.] § 1610 [2012] . . . is 
ambiguous.”); Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 765 (making note that 
Congress “fail[ed] to specify the other parts of the section to which § 1610(g) refers” 
and the general “lack of clarity in § 1610(g)”). 
219. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 961 (“We acknowledge that § 1610 . . . is 
ambiguous. In that circumstance, we may consider legislative history.”); United 
States v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 315 (1953) (“Where the words [of the 
questioned statute] are ambiguous, the judiciary may properly use the legislative 
history to reach a conclusion.”).
220. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 961 (“That history suggests that §1610(g) was 
meant to allow attachment and execution with respect to any property whatsoever of
the foreign state or its instrumentality.”) (emphasis added); see also supra Section 
III.A.
221. See In re Islamic Republic of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 
53 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The relevant exceptions to the general rule of immunity from the 
attachment or execution are listed in § 1610. Prior to the enactment of [the 2008 
FSIA amendments], however, these exceptions to the general rule of immunity for 
foreign government property were limited almost exclusively to property relating to 
the commercial activities of the foreign sovereign within the United States. . . . 
Given the lack of formal relations between the United States and Iran, these 
provisions have been of little utility to the judgment creditors of Iran in FSIA 
terrorism cases.”); Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 761. 
222. See supra Section III.A (explaining how the senators intended 
§ 1610(g) to allow victims to attach and execute upon property which the foreign 
sovereign had beneficial ownership).
223. See supra Section III.A.
224. See Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 
1998) (discussing how Congress allowed for punitive damages so that “the 
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any property owned by the foreign nation—regardless of whether it 
also satisfies the commercial use exceptions—would arguably have a 
more significant deterrent effect.225
The framework of the FSIA and § 1610 also supports the Rubin 
plaintiffs’ position.226 As the Seventh Circuit held in Gates and 
Wyatt, § 1610(g) allows for a “much broader range” of assets to be 
used for attachment and execution purposes.227 The court made this 
conclusion on the basis that § 1610(g) is substantially different from 
the other subsections of § 1610,228 and that § 1610(g) provides for the 
attachment of a foreign sovereign’s property irrespective of the 
commercial use exceptions.229 Further, the Ninth Circuit in Bennett 
found that the subject matter of § 1610(g) is unique compared to the 
other subsections of § 1610.230 Because § 1610(g) only applies to 
judgments awarded under § 1605A231—which revokes a foreign 
nation’s immunity to suit for instances of terrorism, and not its 
commercial activity within the United States232—§ 1610(g) should 
not be limited in its application to only covering property which also 
falls under the commercial use exceptions.233
exception for immunity [would] have the desired deterrent effect”); see also 
Thomas, supra note 11, at 283 (discussing that “one of the main reasons for the 
terrorist state exception to FSIA” was “that terrorist states should be forced to pay 
for their actions in order to deter them from future terrorist acts”).
225. See Curavic, supra note 183, at 398-401 (analyzing and concluding that 
the FSIA and § 1610(g), as they stand, have done little to deter foreign state-
sponsors of terrorism).
226. See supra Section II.C (noting how in Gates, Wyatt, and Bennett, the 
courts looked to the statutory framework of § 1610 in concluding that § 1610(g) was 
substantially different from the other subsections). 
227. See Wyatt v. Syrian Arab Republic, 800 F.3d 331, 343 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming the holding in Gates); Gates v. Syrian Arab Republic, 755 F.3d 568, 576 
(7th Cir. 2014).
228. See Gates, 755 F.3d at 576.
229. See id. (“Section 1610(g) provides that in cases of state-sponsored 
terrorism, assets of the defendant’s agencies and instrumentalities are subject to 
attachment and execution regardless of factors that would ordinarily insulate such 
assets in other contexts governed by § 1610(a) and (b).”).
230. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949, 959 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
231. See § 1610(g)(1) (“[T]he property of a foreign state against which a 
judgment is entered under [28 U.S.C. §] 1605A [2008] . . . is subject to attachment 
in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment.”).
232. See § 1605A(a)(1).
233. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 959 (“Section 1610(g) requires only that a 
judgment under § 1605A have been rendered against the foreign state; in that event, 
both the property of the foreign state and the property of an agency or 
instrumentality of that state are subject to attachment and execution.”).
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On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Rubin held that 
interpreting § 1610(g) as a freestanding exception would violate 
canons of statutory construction, particularly the canon against 
surplusage.234 However, the Supreme Court does not need to use 
canons of statutory construction in making its determination, for the 
canons are not mandatory rules, and they are only “designed to help 
judges determine the Legislature’s intent as embodied in particular 
statutory language.”235 Furthermore, other facts demonstrating 
legislative intent can trounce the force of such canons.236 Moreover, 
interpreting § 1610(g) as demanding the sought-after property be 
used for commercial activity would require the Court to read in a 
limitation that Congress itself did not place.237 Given the 
congressional intent—that the 2008 FSIA amendments were to make 
it easier for victims to collect on their terrorism-related 
judgments238—an interpretation that limits the scope of § 1610(g) to 
only apply to property used for commercial activity would pervert 
the stated purpose.239 In short, § 1610(g) is open to two reasonable 
234. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 484 (7th Cir. 
2016) (citing TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)).
235. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001). Even if the 
Court were to use canons of statutory construction in deciding this issue, and even 
though the Court has previously said that it has a duty “to give effect, if possible, to 
every clause and word of a statute,” Inhabitants of Montclair Twp. v. Ramsdell, 107 
U.S. 147, 152 (1883), this may be offset by “the canon that permits a court to reject 
words ‘as surplusage’ if ‘inadvertently inserted or if repugnant to the rest of the 
statute,’” Chickasaw, 534 U.S. at 94 (citing KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON 
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 525 (1960)). Furthermore, the canon allowing 
the removal of surplus words “has particular force here where the surplus words 
consist simply of a numerical cross-reference in a parenthetical.” Id. (citing Cabell 
Huntington Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 101 F.3d 984, 990 (4th Cir. 1996)). Given the 
ambiguous nature of the “as provided in this section” language, one could argue that 
this phrase is as good as a parenthetical and should be rejected as surplusage. See 
§ 1610(g)(1).
236. See Chickasaw, 534 U.S. at 94.
237. See Bennett, 825 F.3d at 960 (citing United States v. Temple, 105 U.S. 
(9 Otto) 97, 99 (1881)).
238. See id. at 961 (“That history suggests that § 1610(g) was meant to allow 
attachment and execution with respect to any property whatsoever of the foreign 
state or its instrumentality.”); 154 CONG. REC. 500 (2008) (statement of Sen. 
Lautenberg) (Section 1610(g) would “[allow] attachment of the assets of a state 
sponsor of terrorism to be made upon the satisfaction of a ‘simple ownership’ test”); 
supra Section III.A.
239. See Rubin, 830 F.3d at 490 (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (“[I]n interpreting 
an ambiguous statutory text, we can and should draw on statutory purpose and 
legislative history. We must choose one side or the other. The balance here should 
weigh in favor of the reading that favors the victims. We should not attribute to 
584 Michigan State Law Review 2017
interpretations, and the Court must make a decision: either support 
foreign state sponsors of terrorism or support innocent victims.240
And because it was the clear, bipartisan, bicameral intent of 
Congress to make it easier for lamenting victims to fulfill their 
outstanding judgments against those responsible for death, injury, 
and loss by “significantly expanding” the quantity and accessibility 
of property,241 the Court must uphold such purpose.
A definitive ruling by the Supreme Court—holding that 
§ 1610(g) is indeed a freestanding exception to attachment and 
execution immunity and allows for the use of any property owned by 
the foreign sovereign and its instrumentalities—would fulfill 
Congress’s intent and purpose.242 Such a ruling would also square 
neatly within the statutory framework of the FSIA and § 1610 as a 
whole.243 As it stands, the lower courts have created a patchwork of 
decisions and solutions to an important statutory question and have 
thus totally defeated the underlying statutory objectives.244 Therefore, 
the Supreme Court should provide a firm solution for victims who 
have yet to see the satisfaction of their terrorism-related judgments 
by holding that § 1610(g) affords victims the ability to attach and 
execute upon any property located within the United States that the 
foreign sovereign owns.245
B. Political, Diplomatic, and Cultural Considerations that May Cut 
Against a Finding of a Freestanding Exception Should Have No 
Bearing on the Court’s Decision-Making 
There are, of course, those who do not agree that the Supreme 
Court should make such a ruling.246 Some argue that the Supreme 
Court has no right to decide such an issue because of its foreign 
policy implications.247 Others argue that interpreting § 1610(g) as a 
freestanding exception could strain relations with Iran and other 
Congress an intent to be so solicitous of state sponsors of terrorism, who are also 
undeserving beneficiaries of the unusual steps taken by the Rubin panel.”). 
240. See id. at 489-90 (Hamilton, J., dissenting).
241. See supra Section III.A.
242. See supra notes 220-225 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 227-233 and accompanying text.
244. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 761.
245. See supra notes 220-225 and accompanying text.
246. See, e.g., Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 765 (arguing that 
Congress, rather than the Supreme Court, should decide the scope of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(g) (2012)).
247. See infra Subsection IV.B.1.
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state-sponsors of terrorism.248 In addition, some argue that such a 
ruling would detrimentally harm institutes of higher learning and 
violate international treaties.249 Ultimately, these arguments should 
hold no weight with the Supreme Court.250
1. This Is a Determination that Should Be Left to Congress and 
the Executive Branch
Given the patchwork of decisions regarding the correct 
interpretation of § 1610(g), some argue that Congress and the 
Executive Branch should be the ones to fix the problem, not the 
Supreme Court.251 Because § 1610(g) is in essence a codification of 
foreign policy, some contend it should fall upon the political 
branches of the U.S. government to correct and clarify the language 
of § 1610(g).252 However, while this argument may have some merit, 
it is not so persuasive; as the Supreme Court itself noted in Bank 
Markazi, when the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was enacted in 
1976, Congress conveyed the responsibility for determining a foreign 
state’s immunity from the Executive to the Judicial Branch.253
Furthermore, determining the Rubin case and its issues presented is 
not a political question outside of the Court’s authority to decide; 
rather, the Court must decide whose interpretation of § 1610(g) is 
correct, the Rubin plaintiffs’ or Iran’s—certainly a “familiar judicial 
248. See infra Subsection IV.B.2.
249. See infra Subsection IV.B.3.
250. See infra Subsections IV.B.1-B.3.
251. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 768 (“There are, then, 
substantial arguments to be made on both sides of the question of foreign sovereign 
asset immunity in terrorism cases – but they are not arguments to be directed to the 
courts.”).
252. See id. (“[B]ecause terrorism is a foreign policy problem, it is best dealt 
with by the political branches of government rather than by a wide array of courts 
and judges engaging in their own foreign policy experiments.”) (quoting Daveed 
Gartenstein-Ross, Note, A Critique of the Terrorism Exception to the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 887, 888 (2002)). Others 
also suggest that Congress should establish a victim’s compensation fund similar to, 
but more expansive than, the U.S. Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund. See 
generally Claire E. Stephens, Note, Storming the Persian Gates: The Seventh Circuit 
Denies Attachment to Iranian Antiquities, 12 SEVENTH CIR. REV. 164 (2016).
253. See Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1329 (2016); Hoye, 
supra note 28, at 115 (noting that the FSIA “transfers immunity determinations from 
the Department of State to the judiciary”) (citation omitted).
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exercise.”254 Thus, the Court would only be exercising its power 
under the Constitution and utilizing its expertise on statutory 
interpretation to determine whether § 1610(g) is a freestanding 
exception; it would not be superseding foreign policy assessments of 
Congress and the Executive Branch with its own “unmoored 
determination” of what such policy should be.255
2. Relations with Iran and Other State-Sponsors of Terrorism 
Could Become Further Strained
Assuming that one of the main purposes of § 1605A is to deter 
foreign sovereigns from providing any funding or support to terrorist 
organizations,256 a Supreme Court ruling which holds that § 1610(g) 
allows for any property of a foreign sovereign to be subject to 
attachment and execution could possibly damage relations with Iran 
and other state-sponsors of terrorism.257 As the Seventh Circuit noted 
in Rubin, attachment and seizure of a foreign sovereign’s assets 
located in the United States is perceived as a “serious affront” to that 
254. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1427 
(2012) (“The lower courts ruled that this case involves a political question because 
deciding Zivotofsky’s claim [that the U.S. Department of State wrongfully denied 
his right to have Israel as his place of birth on his passport] would force the Judicial 
Branch to interfere with the President’s exercise of constitutional power committed 
to him alone. . . . This misunderstands the issue presented. Zivotofsky does not ask 
the courts to determine whether Jerusalem is the capital of Israel. He instead seeks to 
determine whether he may vindicate his statutory right . . . to choose to have Israel 
recorded on his passport as his place of birth. . . . The existence of a statutory right 
. . . is certainly relevant to the Judiciary’s power to decide Zivotofsky’s claim. . . . 
Zivotofsky requests that the courts enforce a specific statutory right. To resolve his 
claim, the Judiciary must decide if Zivotofsky’s interpretation of the statute is 
correct. . . . This is a familiar judicial exercise.”).
255. See id. at 1427 (“The federal courts are not being asked to supplant a 
foreign policy decision of the political branches with the courts’ own unmoored 
determination of what United States policy toward Jerusalem should be.”).
256. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
257. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 767 (“[F]oreign assets 
present in the United States are useful leverage in negotiations, these assets could 
assist in normalizing relations with countries not currently U.S. allies, and countries 
facing seizure of their property by U.S. courts might retaliate with their own similar 
legislation, putting American assets abroad at risk.”) (citation omitted); see also 
supra note 45 and accompanying text. See generally Troy C. Homesley III, Note, 
“Towards a Strategy of Peace”: Protecting the Iran Nuclear Accord Despite $46 
Billion in State-Sponsored Terror Judgments, 95 N.C. L. Rev. 795 (2017).
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state’s sovereignty.258 As such, the U.S. government has regularly 
opposed efforts by victims to collect from foreign nations.259 In fact, 
the U.S. Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief in Rubin,
supporting Iran in its arguments.260 It cannot be denied that the 
Executive Branch has a legitimate interest and control over the 
country’s international relations with state-sponsors of terrorism and 
other foreign sovereigns; therefore, it has somewhat compelling 
reasons for supporting Iran and other countries that have failed to 
fulfill their outstanding judgments to victims of terrorism.261
However, the fact that the United States allows foreign 
sovereigns to be sued in our country at all lessens the impact of that 
argument.262 It seems rather cruel and hypocritical to allow victims 
the right to sue a foreign state-sponsor of terrorism, while putting 
forth substantial effort in making it nearly impossible for victims to 
collect.263 In addition, though the government may seek to convince 
258. Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 480 (7th Cir. 2016). 
The Rubin court held that attachment and seizure “of a foreign state’s property 
carries potentially far-reaching implications for American property abroad.” Id.
259. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 767. (“Indeed the 
executive branch has consistently opposed efforts to collect assets from foreign 
governments to satisfy terrorism judgments. As it has in similar cases, the U.S. 
government under the Obama Administration filed a brief supporting Iran’s position 
in Rubin. The Clinton and Bush Administrations both opposed similar efforts to 
seize foreign assets.”) (citation omitted). See generally Brief for the United States, 
supra note 103.
260. See Brief for the United States, supra note 103, at 22-26; see also Brief 
for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 16-
534 (U.S. May 23, 2017). The government never discussed the legislative intent or 
statutory purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) and portends that “litigation against 
foreign states in U.S. courts can have significant foreign affairs implications for the 
United States and can affect the reciprocal treatment of the United States in the 
courts of other nations.” Brief for the United States, supra note 103, at 1. 
261. See Seventh Circuit Holds, supra note 112, at 767. “Given the executive 
branch’s role as the day-to-day manager of the United States’ international relations, 
its reasons for such opposition make sense.” Id. (citation omitted).
262. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1605 (2016), 1605A (2008), 1605B (2016) (listing 
the exceptions to a foreign state’s sovereign immunity).
263. The U.S. Department of Justice admits that the government encouraged 
University of Chicago to transfer the Chogha Mish collection, one in which the 
Rubin plaintiffs sought to execute their judgment upon, back to Iran in accordance 
with other Executive Branch orders. See Brief for the United States, supra note 103,
at 8-9. This re-routing of assets by the U.S. government happens often when those 
assets are blocked by the President and removed from “the pool of funds” available 
to victims. See Strauss, supra note 47, at 322. For example, during the Iraq War, 
President George W. Bush transferred approximately $1.73 billion in previously 
frozen Iraqi assets into the Development Fund for Iraq held by the U.S. government; 
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the Supreme Court that these foreign policy considerations are worth
finding in favor of Iran and other foreign state-sponsors of terrorism 
with outstanding judgments, the Court should give the government 
no “special deference.”264
3. Allowing Victims to Attach and Execute upon Cultural 
Artifacts Is Reprehensible and Violates UNESCO 
Conventions
Though the Supreme Court may only base its ruling on existing 
law, many suggest that if the Court allows the Rubin plaintiffs to 
execute and collect on the Persepolis Collection at the University of 
Chicago—or any historical and cultural institute, for that matter—it
would set a dangerous precedent and do irreparable harm to the 
future of American museums and cultural institutions.265 Courts have 
not yet decided whether cultural property loaned from foreign 
countries to such institutes is amenable to attachment and execution 
under § 1610(g).266 Museums and other cultural institutes that house 
foreign, cultural artifacts argue that such property must be excused 
from attachment and execution.267 If not, foreign sovereigns would 
likely stop lending their cultural artifacts to American institutions.268
“[t]hese and other subsequent actions of the President have made Iraq’s frozen assets 
unavailable to victims who obtain judgments against Iraq for its connection with 
terrorism.” Id. at 324-25 n.73 (citation omitted). As the District Court for 
Washington, D.C. put it, this is a “quintessential example of the federal government 
promising with one hand what it takes away with the other.” In re Islamic Republic 
of Iran Terrorism Litig., 659 F. Supp. 2d 31, 55 (D.D.C. 2009).
264. See Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 701 (2004) (“The 
issue now before us, to which the Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae is 
addressed, concerns interpretation of the FSIA’s reach—a ‘pure question of 
statutory construction . . . well within the province of the Judiciary.’ . . . While the 
United States’ views on such an issue are of considerable interest to the Court, they 
merit no special deference.”) (internal citation omitted). This Author uses the phrase 
“may seek to convince” because the United States did not discuss foreign policy 
implications in its amicus curiae brief it submitted in response to the petition for a 
writ of certiorari. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 260.
265. See Heath & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 460-61; Hilton, supra note 11,
at 517; On the Attachment of Cultural Objects, supra note 11.
266. See Hilton, supra note 11, at 482, 517 (“Loans of art from a foreign 
government to an American museum have been found to constitute commercial 
activity. . . . [But] [n]o court has yet decided whether cultural property in a 
[museum] exhibit is amenable to attachment under the FSIA[].”).
267. See id. at 517; see also On the Attachment of Cultural Objects, supra 
note 11 (“[The Archaeological Institute of America] believe[s] that archaeological 
artifacts should not be sold to satisfy a court judgment, regardless of the actions of a 
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However, this argument is tenuous at best. Foreign states may 
avail themselves of the protections under the Immunity From Seizure 
Act (IFSA) if the state is genuinely concerned for its artifacts.269 The
IFSA provides recourse for foreign states to protect their cultural 
artifacts from being seized while they are on loan to American 
museums and institutions.270 If the requirements for an IFSA 
application are met by the foreign state, and the State Department 
grants immunity for the cultural property, then a judgment creditor—
such as the Rubin plaintiffs and others with outstanding judgments 
against state-sponsors of terrorism—cannot seize that foreign state’s 
property that is in the United States while on a “cultural 
exchange.”271
Another argument for excusing the Persepolis Collection at the 
University of Chicago—or any cultural artifact or property—from 
being subject to attachment and execution is that the United States 
has a duty under the UNESCO Cultural Property Convention to act 
particular regime, and that it should be possible for nations to share their cultural 
heritage without fear of loss. . . . [Such legal actions] therefore pose a serious threat 
to cultural exchange and cultural diplomacy, which are extremely important in 
building understanding among peoples.”).
268. See On the Attachment of Cultural Objects, supra note 11 (“If the 
United States is in the practice of confiscating artifacts that belong to other nations, 
then other nations will be unlikely to lend objects to U.S. cultural institutions. In 
addition, the U.S. will make itself vulnerable to the confiscation of its own cultural 
objects on loan in foreign nations.”); see also Heath & Schwartz, supra note 11, at 
460-61 (discussing how the Metropolitan Museum of Art, which was to put on an 
exhibit featuring artifacts on temporary loan from Syria, was unable to borrow those 
objects for fear that they would be subject to attachment in cases where Syria had 
not paid their outstanding, terrorism-related judgments).
269. See 22 U.S.C. § 2459(a) (1965); Hilton, supra note 11, at 517.
270. See § 2459(a) (“Whenever any work of art or other object of cultural 
significance is imported into the United States from any foreign country, pursuant to 
an agreement entered into between the foreign owner . . . and the United States or 
one or more cultural or educational institutions within the United States providing 
for the temporary exhibition or display thereof within the United States at any 
cultural exhibition . . . administered, operated, or sponsored, without profit, by any 
such cultural or educational institution, no court of the United States . . . may issue 
or enforce any judicial process, or enter any judgment, decree, or order, for the 
purpose or having the effect of depriving such institution . . . of custody or control of 
such object if before the importation of such object the President or his designee has 
determined that such object is of cultural significance and that the temporary 
exhibition or display thereof within the United States is in the national interest, and a 
notice to that effect has been published in the Federal Register.”); Hilton, supra note 
11, at 517 (discussing the IFSA).
271. Hilton, supra note 11, at 520 (citing Malewicz v. Amsterdam, 362 F. 
Supp. 2d 298, 311 (D.D.C. 2005)).
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in coordination with other signatory nations to protect and preserve 
cultural property as “a finite, depletable and nonrenewable 
resource.”272 The United States accepted this Convention in 1983, 
which defines cultural property as that which has been designated by 
the signatory states to be important to “archaeology, prehistory, 
history, literature, art or science” and belongs to categories such as 
archeological excavations, antiquities over a century old, and 
property of ethnological interest.273 The Persepolis Collection at the 
University of Chicago is on a long-term academic loan for study of 
Elamite writing.274 Given what the Convention claims to protect, 
these tablets might qualify as being of ethnological interest and of 
importance to history and literature.275
However, while such a collection might be qualified under the 
UNESCO Convention, allowing the tablets to return to Iran may 
result in their loss or destruction.276 Fundamentalist administrations 
that provide support to terrorist organizations, such as Iran, have a 
reputation for being ill-suited at protecting ancient and cultural 
artifacts.277 Therefore, the attachment and execution of the Persepolis 
272. Thomas, supra note 11, at 288 (citing PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART,
CULTURAL HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 642 (2004)). See also
UNESCO Constitution, supra note 11, at art 1(2)(c) (“To realize this purpose the 
Organization will: maintain, increase and diffuse knowledge; by assuring the 
conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works of art and 
monuments of history and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the 
necessary international conventions; by encouraging co-operation among the nations 
in all branches of intellectual activity, including the international exchange of 
persons active in the fields of education, science and culture and the exchange of 
publications, objects of artistic and scientific interest and other materials of 
information; by initiating methods of international co-operation calculated to give 
the people of all countries access to the printed and published materials produced by 
any of them.”).
273. UNESCO Cultural Property Convention, supra note 11. This 
designation may be made on either religious or secular grounds. See id.
274. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 637 F.3d 783, 787 (7th Cir. 
2011).
275. See supra notes 272-273 and accompanying text.
276. See Hilton, supra note 11, at 484.
277. See id. at 484-85 (discussing how in Iran and Afghanistan, the 
governments failed to protect ancient archaeological sites from being attacked and 
destroyed). Furthermore, ISIS has made it one of its propagandist missions to cause 
mass-destruction at dozens of archaeological sites and museums, including the 
ancient Syrian city of Palmyra and the Mosul Museum of Iraq, to name a few. See 
Andrew Curry, Here Are the Ancient Sites ISIS Has Damaged and Destroyed,
NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Sept. 1, 2015), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/
2015/09/150901-isis-destruction-looting-ancient-sites-iraq-syria-archaeology/ 
[https://perma.cc/3XE2-ABDD].
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Collection—which would require the tablets to be sold in order for 
the Rubin plaintiffs to satisfy their monetary judgment—would more 
than likely save the tablets; the Persepolis Collection could be 
purchased by the United States government, American museums and 
institutes, or foreign museums and institutes.278 This solution would 
thus serve all parties involved: Victims of state-sponsored terrorism 
would be able to satisfy their outstanding judgments, and cultural 
artifacts and property would be in the hands of those most capable of 
preservation.279
In short, the worries and concerns of those who believe that 
§ 1610(g) is not a freestanding terrorism exception should hold no 
weight with the Supreme Court.280 Determining the correct 
interpretation of § 1610(g) is a “familiar judicial exercise” for the 
Court.281 Congress conveyed to the Court the power and authority to 
determine a foreign sovereign’s immunity;282 thus, the Court should 
uphold the intent of Congress and hold that § 1610(g) allows victims 
to attach and execute upon any property of the state-sponsor of 
terrorism.283
C. Interpreting § 1610(g) Correctly Is Imperative and Needs to Be 
Addressed as Soon as Possible
Because the most recent decision in Rubin created a circuit split 
between the Seventh and Ninth Circuits, and overruled two prior 
decisions in the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court granted the 
Rubin plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of certiorari.284 However, if the 
Court chooses not to decide this issue now, the Court will likely be 
forced to in the near future.285 As it stands, victims of state-sponsored 
278. See Hilton, supra note 11, at 485.
279. See supra notes 276-278 and accompanying text. 
280. See supra Subsections IV.B.1-B.3. 
281. See supra note 254 and accompanying text.
282. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Section IV.A.
284. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 108, at 22 (noting that 
“[this] issue is ripe for Supreme Court review”). It is unclear as of this publication 
whether the Court will merge the petitions of the Rubin plaintiffs and of the Iranian
government from Bennett. See Bennett v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 825 F.3d 949 
(9th Cir. 2016), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Bank Melli v. Bennett (U.S. Sept. 
12, 2016) (No. 16-334) (asking the Court to determine whether § 1610(g) is a 
freestanding exception to attachment and execution immunity).
285. See supra Section III.B (discussing some of the legislation passed after 
the 2008 FSIA amendments which seeks to aid victims of terrorism).
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terrorism are rarely able to satisfy their outstanding judgments 
against foreign sovereigns.286 What few commercial assets these 
foreign nations have within the United States have been subjected 
not only to a complicated collection of statutory and regulatory 
authorities,287 but also conflicting actions by competing victims.288
While Congress attempted to broaden the range of assets that victims 
could use for judgment satisfaction,289 the Seventh Circuit chose to 
limit those victims’ ability to collect.290
The Supreme Court must affirm the statutory objectives of 
§ 1610(g).291 Doing so would not only fulfill the congressional intent 
and purpose of § 1610(g), but would also fit within the statutory 
framework of the FSIA and § 1610.292 Because Congress transferred 
the power to make immunity determinations from the Executive to 
the Judiciary Branch,293 it is well within the Supreme Court’s 
authority to make this decision.294 Thus, the Supreme Court should 
give relief to the Rubin plaintiffs and others like them and hold that 
§ 1610(g) is a freestanding exception to attachment and execution 
immunity and allows victims to use any property owned by the 
foreign sovereign and located within the United States for judgment 
satisfaction.295
CONCLUSION
The language of § 1610(g) is unclear as to how this section 
truly applies, and there has been no definitive ruling on whether 
§ 1610(g) provides a freestanding basis for the execution of 
terrorism-related judgments, which would abrogate the need for the 
sought-after property to be used commercially.296 Ignoring prior 
precedent in its own circuit, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Rubin
286. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
287. See supra notes 167-168 and accompanying text.
288. See supra note 212 and accompanying text.
289. See supra Section III.A.
290. See supra Section II.B.
291. See supra Section IV.A.
292. See supra Section IV.A.
293. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 254-255 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Section IV.A.
296. See Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 830 F.3d 470, 489 (7th Cir. 
2016) (Hamilton, J., dissenting) (finding that the majority’s interpretation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1610(g) (2012) “shelters from execution a wide range of assets of state 
sponsors of terrorism”); supra Sections II.B, II.C. 
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has the effect of making it nearly impossible for victims of state-
sponsored terrorism to recover their unfulfilled judgments.297
Looking to the background and framework of the FSIA298 the history 
of the Rubin plaintiffs’ plight,299 the differing circuit 
interpretations,300 and the legislative history of the 2008 FSIA 
amendments,301 § 1610(g) should be interpreted as a freestanding 
exception to attachment and execution immunity, allowing for any 
property owned by the state-sponsor of terrorism and located within 
the United States to be used for judgment satisfaction.302 Doing so 
would allow victims of state-sponsored terrorism to hold foreign 
sovereigns truly accountable for their actions, and would allow 
victims to recover against a broader category of foreign-owned 
property, ultimately making recovery practicable for persons deemed 
worthy by Congress.303
297. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
298. See supra Part I.
299. See supra Sections II.A, II.B.
300. See supra Section II.C.
301. See supra Section III.A.
302. See supra Section IV.A.
303. See supra Section IV.A.
